| Home - Human Nature Review | What's new | Search | Feedback |

Transitional Phenomena: Production and Consumption

by Robert M. Young

This is an exploratory essay, designed to illustrate a mode of analysis. At its roots lie the ideas of D.W. Winnicott on transitional objects and transitional phenomena and of Wilfred Bion on the alimentary basis of all knowing. Winnicott argued that the child's first 'not me' - neither subjective nor objective but partaking of both - was the basis of all culture, all religion, all play, all scientific creativity. Bion argued that the process of knowing never transcends its primitive origins in the alimentary canal and that all of the senses and all of thought continue to function according to primitive mechanisms, whatever else they are doing at the same time. Hence, emotion lies at the heart of the thinking process (Meltzer, 1986, p.301). My point in this and in a previous paper (Young, 1986) is to begin to see what it would be like to take these thoughts seriously when applied to scientific knowledge, to culture, to leisure and to the rest of life.

I want to make a beginning at relating production, consumption and psychoanalysis - large topics. In particular, I am interested in the bearing of psychoanalysis on the origin and production of scientific ideas and on the An earlier version of this paper was delivered to the first conference on Psychoanalysis and the Public Sphere, London, October 1987. creation and consumption of culture. But these merge easily, since I think of science as part of culture, not above it and certainly not its arbiter. This is not a particularly eccentric view, since it has become commonplace in recent research in the history, philosophy and social studies of science. I also think of culture-as-consumed as increasingly mediated by science, technology and medicine. This is also a fairly commonplace thought, if one considers satellite communications, high-fidelity, health fads and the drug industry.

If we look at the philosophy of science and technology through Kleinian and Winnicottian lenses, we are left with no 'conflict-free sphere of the ego'. If we consider the theory of knowledge in this light, the Enlightenment project of objective, value free rationality becomes a will-o-the-wisp. We are then empowered to embark upon exploration of the emotional origins and the ideological determinations of knowledge.

In recent work in the philosophy of science, it has become uncontroversial to say that all facts are theory-laden, that all theories are value-laden and that all values are constituted by ideological frameworks. Another fashionable way of putting that is that truth is made, not found. Since the sociology and anthropology of knowledge have been fully extended into science, it was thought that the relativists, contextualists and constitutivists had touched bottom. Relativists eschewed objectivity; contextualists broke down the conventional separation of science from its socio-economic and ideological contexts; constitutivists argued that truth is socially constructed and that its criteria are constituted by the forces that evoke enquiry.

Once the special status of science above culture was undermined, some of us came along and treated the history of ideas, including scientific ideas, as culture - as a moving army of metaphors. This approach included the deepest ideas of the greatest scientists - gravity, affinity, natural selection, that is, physics, chemistry and biology in their most profound and basic theoretical assumptions. Could there be more? Apparently so. Psychoanalysis holds out the hope of transcending the positivism of the origins of knowledge, just as various radical approaches to knowledge - going beyond the sociology of knowledge to its anthropology have transcended the positivism of context. Traditional positivism separated fact from value. Psychoanalysis can help us to overcome the separation of fact from meaning and motive.

Turning from the origin and production of ideas to the creation and consumption of culture, my recent experience is that high-tech consumption has become ubiquitous. For my generation this meant records, radio, movies and hi-fi. For my children it has meant video and walkmans and will one day include implants in the ears and receivers inside the skull. But technology, like all else, is historically relative, just as the concept of culture is, so we must not be too imaginatively impoverished and forget to notice what it felt like for my grandfather to be able to buy a dime novel or his grandfather to buy a penny magazine, and so on to Gutenberg and medieval illuminated manuscripts, ancient scrolls and prehistoric cave paintings. Each seemed remarkable when it was new. Each seemed the epitome of technology. Each was treated as a comfort, a source of deep satisfaction. Each was neither subjective nor objective but partook of both.

An analogous point can be made about epistemology. The idea that symbolism and metaphor lay at the heart of science was not new to Charles Darwin when he spoke of 'natural selection' as a metaphor or to recent philosophers who have treated science as culture, for example, Richard Rorty. This insight was commonplace in Renaissance philosophy, just as was the shaping of nature into gardens in which the microcosm reflected the macrocosm. I once made a film in which the historicity of nature was illustrated in successive periods by a series of gardens, culminating in a garden city and an urban garden centre. That is, every period had its own conception of a garden, offering a highly-condensed version of how nature was conceived at that time (Young and Gold, 1982). Nature has never been raw: for humankind it is has always been symbolic, metaphorical, anthropomorphic, shaped, cooked.

How does all this bring us to psychoanalysis at the heart of experience - either in creating or consuming? It does so by way of the debate about transitional objects and transitional phenomena. I say debate, because no sooner do we invoke Winnicott's ideas about the primitive and persistent roots of culture, than we discover that it was on this very point that he and Melanie Klein fell out, so that a modern-day Kleinian would say that there are no transitional objects - only failed primary object relations. But just so. Is there such a gap between the theory of trying to recover the object via creativity and play, on the one hand, and that of trying to reconstitute it via reparation, on the other? I don't see the rift, but I haven't persuaded any of the Winnicottian or Kleinian sectarians to help me to sort it out, either. Nor have I been able to fathom it in my own reading.

Until we get some illumination on this point, I shall persist in saying that no matter how it is solved, both Kleinians and Winnicottians (though not Freudians) will agree that both the epistemology of science and that of cultural studies cry out for integration with each other and with psychoanalytic epistemology. It's obvious once you think of it.

Once we move off a positivist philosophy of science and accept that knowledge never severs its links with its genesis or its context - that, on the contrary, it is constituted by them - then how can primitive psychogenesis be left out? Or rather, how can it not be fundamental? The Habermasian hermeneuticists have argued that psychoanalysis as reflexive knowledge - is the paradigm for all the rest. Interpersonal knowledge, including the moment of self-reflection, becomes the norm: I/thou rather than I/it. Introspection and interpersonal knowledge are not ways of knowing that fall short of scientific objectivity. Rather, scientific knowledge becomes a highly-abstracted and rather worrying special case - an impoverishment of deeper, fuller knowing. Psychoanalytic knowledge is not only the model, ie. the formal exemplar: it is the foundation.

Similarly in the sphere of consumption, once we grasp the persistence of transitional objects and transitional phenomena into adult life, can we fail to see how perfectly stereo, surround sound, indwelling earphones and deeply-textured music and video enfold one. In my view this sensuous recovery of the infantile idyll extends to Porshes, BMW's (cars and motorbikes), Muddy Fox and Claude Butler bicycles, Sony Professional Walkmans, Dolby C noise reduction, Video 8, Camera, instant cassette reverse with only 0.3 seconds delay at the end of the tape before the continuous music is resumed, digital insert earphones, stereo enhancers for videos, compact discs, digital audio tape, and more to come, so as to enrich the resonance and texture of cultural consumption.

When I built a special pair of speakers to do justice to the base notes in the Rolling Stones' 'Sympathy for the Devil' in the 1960's, I had no idea that in two decades I'd be made newly orgasmic by a pair of earphones smaller than a sixpence or that I would gladly pay all I had for a car system more powerful, moving and reverberative than the one in my sitting room. Or that I would get greater solace from these than from practically any other experience I've ever had. Breast, womb, object - near perfect reunion. The sensuous satisfactions of these comforts seemed to at me least as pleasurable as a child's blankets or teddybear.

But the pleasures and comforts do not stop here. They extend to food, clothing, bedding, saunas and jacuzzis, training shoes, luxuriant bathing, massage, the representation of art. There is no end to comfort, to the savouring of design, to the delights of the technologies of relaxation and the Body Shop. Think of all those oils and fragrances, all those soaps and conditioners, all that solace. Who ever said that socialism was the enemy of prosperity? Not Neil Kinnock or the Editor of Marxism Today. Left rhetoric is no longer a language of abstention, of an asceticism in the name of class struggle or sacrifice for the cause. The anhedonic model of the hard left is played out. Consumption is for now, not after 'the victory is ours'. Lest this seem a strange perspective on politics, I should mention that one of the most potent objects of debate in Britain is the personal organiser or Filofax. It is reviled by the old left President of the National Union of Mineworkers, Arthur Scargill. It is extolled and indeed sold by the Euro-communist journal of the British Communist Party, Marxism Today. Filofaxes are attractive, sensuous and offer at least the illusion of containment of one's life. They are transitional objects.

I say that it behoves us to try think about these private phenomena of the public sphere and their role in the organisation of consent. For all her radicalism, when Isodora Duncan's scarf got too long, it strangled her. That is, left asceticism asked too much; left consumerism may take too much of the moral edge off political work.

On the other hand, there is subversive potential in popular culture. Think of the role of music in 1960's, in the 1930's and in the 19th century. Think of radical video, pirate radio, agitational films, strength in banners and tracts. The cynical slogan at the end of the 1960's about how subversion gets domesticated into mere fashion - 'revolt into style' - only captured one moment of the dialectic. Both need our scrutiny.

Returning now to the philosophy of science, technology and medicine, I believe that we should fight decontextualization and the idea that to think of the genesis of knowledge is to commit 'the genetic fallacy'. If we refuse to separate what was once called (by followers of Karl Popper) the context of discovery from the context of justification, then we will know how societies constitute their knowledge. We will achieve this by knowing the forces that evoke them and get them researched and developed. This occurs through patronage, education, careers and, above all, reification and fetishization. In reification relations between people are treated as if they were relations between things. In fetishization, things are treated as if they have magical, human qualities. These two mechanisms disconnect primitive processes, passions and values from products and the processes of production, from theories and things, from commodities and therapies.

One of the consequences of the comfort given by transitional phenomena is that they can become more real and intimate than human relations per se. One of the consequences of the fetishism of commodities is that the products of human hands 'appear as independent beings endowed with life and entering into relations both with one another and the human race'. This arises not only from the commodity form but also from the formation of character in the image of the commodity. As Victor Wolfenstein and Michael Schneider note, 'The objectively inverted reality of "material relations between persons and social relations between things" is thus subjectively reflected in a "perverse displacement of libidinous energies from the world of reified persons into the world of personified objects"' (Wolfenstein, n.d., p.39 quoting Schneider, 1975, p.251). The relations become inverted so that my best friend is my walkman or my personal computer. Some people are so attached to computers that they sever other relationships and become 'computer hacks'. This touches more than a few weird people. Think of the vogue of Herbie Volkswagen films, the children's film 'Dirt Bike' about a motorcycle with its own personality, the personalities R2D2 and C3PO in the 'Star Wars' films, the android knights in 'Aliens 2', the computer in 'War Games', ads for Renault cars which ask 'What's yours called?', highly personalized telephones and earphones, and so on and on in the realm of toys for boys and girls of all ages.

The task for a critique of science and of consumption becomes the tracing of the threads and the seeking out of the connections or articulations so that the more abstract the knowledge, the more dedicated the research task - be it in mathematics, fifth generation computers, fundamental physical particles or genetic engineering. The same kind of questions need to be asked of consumer objects and phenomena. Whence? Cui bono?

Moreover the task of psychoanalytic epistemology, like the psychoanalytic theory of cultural consumption, is that of demystification as well as the subversive development of counter-hegemonic uses, products and processes. If we can reconnect things with motives, uses and values, we can keep our eyes on the emotional resources and social consequences.

I have in mind, for example, shared rather than isolating music and radio, community radio, low budget and open access tv and video, organic farming, community computer memory. All of these have proud histories in various settings in Europe and America and, in some cases, Latin America (see Radical Science Collective, 1985). Other developments - especially genetic engineering - should be halted until their primitive roots become clear and amenable to a more democratic form of social control. At the moment the sequestration of the passions and values involved from the material and efficient causes makes this an alienated and alarming technology.

My text for all of these reflections are the ideas of Winnicott and of Klein, Bion and post-Kleinians on the persistence of the alimentary basis for knowledge, the failure in development ever to transcend primitive assimilative, ruminative and projective mechanisms. If a Kleinian theory of thinking is to be elaborated - and it is in the process of so being - then it will also be a theory of culture, including scientific and technological thinking and linked to what uses we make of science, technology and medicine. The most abstruse solid state physics can be so interpreted, along with fantastic fifth generation computer technologies, the digital watch, the personal computer, the ever more sophisticated camera, sound system and technologies for encoding and decoding both video and audio tapes, as well as systems for pacing, surveillance and control in the work place and for body scanning and washing clothes. They are of a piece: amino acid sequencers, Star Wars technologies and ways of listening to Tchaikovsky, Talking Heads, and Willie Nelson.

Similarly, Winnicott's diagrams in which he tries to convey some of the meanings of transitional objects and phenomena encompass, as he says, 'the whole cultural field'. In a paper on 'Psychoses and Child Care', given nine months after the one on 'Transitional Objects and Transitional Phenomena', he provides very helpful diagrams about this cultural envelope in relation to external and subjective reality and to instinct, dreaming, fantasy, play and work.

(diagram from Winnicott, 1952, p.224)

In the text, he sketches the imbalances that lead to psychosis, hyper-intellectuality and a false life based on splitting. He also refers to the desire to do intellectual work: 'Intellectual understanding converts the not-good-enough environmental adaptation to the good-enough adaptation' (Winnicott, 1952, p.225).

It seems to me that here we have some of the elements of a psycho-sexual developmental psychology as well as an epistemology of science, technology and medicine, that is, of expert knowledge and creativity. One of the tasks of an understanding of psychoanalysis and the public sphere is to trace the deepest roots of both alienated and integrated production and consumption - of both knowledge and of culture.

The idea of a genetic epistemology is not new. Kant put his schemata into the head, and Hegel made the realization of the universal an historical process, while Marx and Engels stressed the historicity of all concepts, including those of science. Piaget rendered this a developmental science, but his research parameters were confined to those of shape and other concepts drawn from physics.

A psycho-sexual genetic epistemology is still a desideratum, while a critical (in the sense of critique, ie questioning the terms of reference, assumptions and concepts) psycho-sexual genetic epistemology is but a gleam in one unreconstructed libertarian socialist's eye/mind. The crucial - the utterly fundamental - reunion lies in the reintegration of that which the scientific revolution and rationalist and empiricist traditions did all they could to abrogate, that is, emotion, value, aim, purpose, use value - the final cause or telos of the Aristotelian causal framework, which found its way into the Marxist concept of the labour process. The labour process perspective was importantly Aristotelian in stressing the means of production, the raw materials, purposive human activity - loosely recalling the Aristotelian material, formal and efficient causes. This leads, of course, to a use value, a purpose or final cause (for further elaboration see Young, 1985). My hope is that this analysis can retain the primitive while examining the utilitarian.

If we look at the efforts to think anew about nature, human nature, farming and industry associated with the feminist, environmental, ecology and Green movements, the aim is to heal the splits that lie at the heart of the scientific revolution. Modern knowledge is founded on a separation of body and mind, primary and secondary qualities, outer and inner, object and subject (see Burtt 1932; Whitehead, 1985). The aim is to reconstitute the totality, the organism. This approach has been arrived at by looking much more closely at the articulations of knowledge and its production - the patronage, funding, hidden motives.

One dimension of all this has been afoot - only partly self-consciously - in the growing interests in the psychobiographies of intellectuals. I have in mind Frank Manuel on Newton; Ralph Colp, Howard Gruber, Jim Moore and myself on Darwin; Steve Heims on Norbert Weiner and John Von Neumann; Evelyn Fox Keller on Barbara McClintock; Andrew Hodges on Alan Turing. In J.D. Sutherland's psychobiography of Ronald Fairbairn,we have a psychoanalyst's careful reflections on psychoanalytic creativity, based on Fairbairn's own intimate notes about his inner world. If we look at group processes, we get some insights from J. D. Watson on The Double Helix and the recent play about the discovery of DNA, 'Life Story', as well as the work of Latour and Woolgar on Laboratory Life.

Among the above only Sutherland provides a full-blooded psychobiography in the way that Victor Wolfenstein's biography of Malcom X is. The others are insufficiently object relational and insufficiently historical. But they make the project I am sketching less implausible. They fill in contexts and motives, life and thought. They help us to understand the intimate determinations and the social processes of intellectual research.

The connections between scientific creativity, on the one hand, and transitional objects and transitional phenomena, on the other, are manifold. An obvious relationship is inside science in the feelings of researchers about their equipment. These are often themselves of the kind to which I am refering - a kind of aestheticism of gear. Who has got the latest computer or amino acid sequencer? At the beginnings of the epoch in biology which is bearing such alarming fruits in genetic engineering, a patron - the Rockefeller Foundation - would give you a fancy ultracentrifuge if you would approach biology according to the parameters of physics. Second, the paradigm case of the great scientist, at the frontiers of knowledge doing research in a university laboratory and free from commercial pressures, has been getting out of date at least since Lord Rothschild outlined a more commercial customer-contract basis of research in the 1970's. The goals of research now come directly from a particular vested interest.

The old view of the disinterested researcher is thus almost wholly out of date in the universities. Beyond that, the majority of funding for research and development is for military work, and more than half of all research funding and nearly half of all researchers in Britain are engaged in this military research work. Of the rest, most scientists and technologists work for commercial firms, for example, ICI and Unilever, and a huge contingent works to make the very same transitional objects and phenomena with which I began this paper, that is, the people that work in the cosmetics, hi-fi, computer and office-equipment industries. The loop is closed for the technical employees at an automated firm when they spend their earnings on the products of that firm. I well remember the longing of Ford workers when I worked in an assembly plant in the early 1950's to own their own Ford.

I am aware throughout this analysis that drawing the boundaries in particular cases and at particular times between transitional objects and phenomena, on the one hand, and clinical fetishism and narcissism on the other, is not easy. I am not really talking about true fetishism, where the object of desire becomes the fetish object, or of true narcissism, where mature object relations do not occur. I am trying to broaden our concept of the transitional area and its central role in production and consumption - all production, even of the most abstruse theories, and all consumption, even of the most primitive forms of pleasure.

I have often wondered how it is that people can work in certain jobs, for example, manufacturing and assembling nuclear weapons. We know that the armaments industry pays a lot of mortgages, but how do its workers think of themselves? Some of the answer lies of course, in splitting and projection, in scapegoating, in rationalization and denial. But some of it also lies in traditional analysis of alienation as eloquently spelled out in Marx's Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844. He speaks there of alienation from the means of production, from the product, from fellow workers and fellow humans and from one's own species being. A writer on the labour process among computer workers in the armaments industry has given details of how programmers have little or no idea of the use to which their sub-routine will be put in the larger program (Hayes, 1986, Ch.6). No idea at all. A civilian computer consultant who read a draft of the book said that exactly the same rules apply in non-military programming for reasons of commercial secrecy, in order to avoid competitors pirating of the program. Only a small number of senior staff know what a program is for. The final cause is split off in the structure of the research.

I know someone who works in optics, a field which you might imagine is a safely obscure branch of physics. He says that it is no longer possible to have any certainty of successfully avoiding military research and funding. You go to a conference, and it turns out to be NATO-sponsored. You get grant money, and it turns out to be at only one remove from questions the military wants answered. You are fascinated with a problem, and the seductions of funding for it or for general lab purposes, are very great, if only you will keep the military informed. Magazines in this field have many adverts for big, high-tech firms. The adverts stress skiing, water sports, tramping and other utterly wholesome activities in the region of, say, Boeing or Rockwell. Bell Labs, where transistors, microprocessors and hundreds of radar and surveillance and encoding techniques were invented in World War II and since, is the largest research institution in the world, with nonpareil of facilities. The joys of working for a given firm are stressed. The military purposes of the work are not even mentioned.

All - I say all - of this blinkering is made possible by emotional as well as formal alienation and the separation of use value and telos from the labour process and the metaphysical foundations of modern science. This process of splitting lies at the heart of modern epistemology.

The understanding of the process, by which we introject this splitting with the world view of science, technology and industry and are socialized into it, could not be more important. At one level it is perfectly well-understood and certainly not confined to high-tech business. One of my closest childhood friends who was almost as hard up as I was when we were children tells me that he is not yet rich by local standards. That is he has not yet got $50,000,000. He is an entrepreneur with the basis of his fortune in oil leases. He says that the norm in his peer group is to get money any way you can. He described a mutual friend with whom I've lost touch who is 'in the real estate business'. He sells graveyard plots to poor blacks for $400, at $5 a week. My friend asked what happened if they pay it off. The reply was that nobody has done that yet; all default at some time during the 80 weeks. However, if anyone did make it to the finish line, there is a clause in the contract saying that another plot could be substituted for the lovely one that the customer was shown. The norm, as I say, is to make money - to compete from Little League baseball at age 6, to near the grave and then to endow a hospital wing, a university chair or a clinic for handicapped children with your name on it. I am, and my friend was, perfectly serious. The getting of money is utterly split off from doing good, though that is an ostensive long-term goal. This is an extreme, though true, example. I chose it to illuminate the norm.

When I talk about the reintegration of emotions, primitive motives, and use values and final causes with other dimensions of work, I am after very large changes. But let us not be too sanguine. One of the things post-Reichian psychoanalysis has taught us is that it is not the case that de-repression opens up good motives. It opens Pandora's Box - motives all mixed up. However, if pursued judiciously, the reintegration of the primitive with the efficient and rational leaves us with the hope of working on these matters rather than having their effects occur only through unconscious processes.

This is the revised text of a talk given to the Psychoanalysis and the Public Sphere Conference, Polytechnic of East London. It was published in B. Richards, ed., Crises of the Self: Further Essays on Psychoanalysis and Politics. Free Association Books, 1989, pp. 56-72.



Barnes, B. and Edge, D., eds. (1982) Science in Context: Readings in the Sociology of Science. Milton Keynes: Open University Press.

Berger, P.L. and Luckmann, T. (1987) The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise on the Sociology of Knowledge. Garden City: Anchor Books.

Bion, W.R. (1977) Seven Servants. New York: Aronson.

Bion, W.R. (1984) Second Thoughts: Selected Papers in Psychoanalysis. Maresfield Reprints.

Brody, S. (1980) 'Transitional objects: idealization of a phenomenon', Psychoanalytic Quarterly, :561-605.

Brown, E.R. (1979) 'He who pays the piper: foundations, the medical profession and medical education', in Reverby, S. and Rosner, D., eds. Health Care in America: Essays in Social History. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, pp. 132-154.

Brown, E.R. (1979) Rockefeller Medicine Men: Medicine and Capitalism in America. University Of California Press.

Burtt, A. (1932) The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Physical Science. 2nd ed., Routledge.

Colp, R.H.Jr. (1977) To Be an Invalid: The Illness of Charles Darwin. University of Chicago Press.

Douglas, Mary (1970) Purity and Danger: An Analysis of Concepts of Pollution and Taboo. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books.

Douglas, Mary, ed. (1973) Rules and Meaning: The Anthropology of Everyday Knowledge. Harmondsworth: Penguin Education.

Douglas, Mary (1975) Implicit Meanings: Essays in Anthropology. Routledge.

Fagen, M., ed. (1975, 1978) A History of Engineering and Science in the Bell System. 2 vols, Bell Telephone Laboratories.

Feyerabend, Paul (1978) Farewell to Reason. Verso.

Fisher, D. (1978) 'The Rockefeller Foundation and the development of scientific medicine in Great Britain', Minerva 16: 20-41.

Fosdick, Raymond B. (1952) The Story of the Rockefeller Foundation. NY: Harper & Row.

Gruber, H.E. (1974) Darwin on Man: A Psychological Study of Scientific Creativity. Wildwood House.

Grolnick, S.A. et al, eds Between Reality and Fantasy: Transitional Objects and Phenomena. Jason Aronson.

Habermas, J. (1972) Knowledge and Human Interests. Heinemann, chs 10-12.

Hales, Mike, (1986) Science or Society? The Politics of the Work of Scientists. Free Association Books.

Heims, J. (1980) John von Neumann and Norbert Wiener: From Mathematics to the Technologies of Life and Death. M.I.T. Press.

Hodges, Andrew, (1983) Alan Turing: The Enigma. Burnett Books.

Horton, A. (1967) 'African traditional thought and Western science', Africa 37, Part I: 'From tradition to science', pp 50-71; Part II: 'The "closed" and "open" predicaments', pp 155-187.

Kahne, M.J. (1967) 'On the persistance of transitional phenomena into adult life', International Journal of Psycho-analysis 48: 247-258.

Keller, E.F. (1983) A Feeling for the Organism: The Life and Work of Barbara McClintock. NY: Freeman.

Klein, M. (1988) Envy and Gratitude and Other Works 1946-1963. Virago.

Knorr-Cetina, D. (1982) 'The constructivist programme in the sociology of science: retreats or advances?', Social Studies of Science 12: pp 320-328.

Knorr-Cetina, D. and Mulkay, M., eds (1983) Science Observed: Perspectives on the Social Study of Science. Sage. (Critique by Tim Rowse, 'Sociology pulls its punches', in L. Levidow, ed., (1986) Science as Politics/Radical Science, 20, Free Association Books, pp. 139-49).

Kohn, D., ed. (1985) The Darwinian Heritage. Princeton.

Kolakowski, L. (1972) Positivist Philosophy from Hume to the Vienna Circle. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books.

Kovel, Joel (1986) Against the State of Nuclear Terror. Free Association Books.

Latour, B. and Woolgar, S. (1979) Laboratory Life: The Social Construction of Scientific Facts. Sage.

Levidow, L., ed. (1986) Radical Science Essays. Free Association Books.

Levidow, L. and Young, R.M.,eds (1983, 1985) Science, Technology and the Labour Process: Marxist Studies. 2 vols, Free Association Books.

Lichtheim, G. (1967) The Concept of Ideology and Other Essays. NY: Vintage.

Lukacs, G. (1971) 'Reification and the consciousnous of the proleterait', in History and Class Consciousness. Merlin Press, pp 83-222.

Mannheim, K. (1960) Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge. Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Manuel, F.E. (1968) A Portrait of Isaac Newton. Cambridge, MA: Harvard.

Marcuse, H. (1968) One Dimensional Man: The Ideology of Industrial Society. Sphere.

Marx, K. (1961) Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844. Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House.

Marx, K. (1976) 'The fetishism of the commodity and its secret', Capital, vol. I. Harmondsworth: Penguin, pp. 163-177.

Hayes, D. (1989) Behind the Silicon Curtain. Free Association Books.

Mattlelart, A. (1985) 'Infoteck and the third world', in Radical Science Collective, eds, Making Waves: The Politics of Communications/Radical Science 16: 27-35.

Meltzer, D. (1985) The Kleinian Development. Perthshire: Clunie Press.

Meltzer, D. (1986) 'Discussion of Ester Bick's paper "Further considerations on the function of the skin in early object relations"', British Journal of Psychotherapy 2: 300-301.

Moore, J.R. (1985) 'Darwin of Down: The evolutionist as squarson-naturalist', in Kohn, 1985, pp 435-81.

Nicolson, W. (1987) 'Life Story' (television play). BBC 2.

Radical Science Collective, eds Making Waves: The Politics of Communications. Free Association Books.

Radical Science Journal Collective, 'Science, technology, medicine and the socialist movement', Radical Science Journal 11 (1981), pp 3-70.

Reich, W. (1972) Sex-Pol: Essays 1929-1934. NY: Vintage Books.

Rifkin, J. (1983) Algeny. NY: Viking Press.

Rorty, Richard (1980) Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature. Oxford: Blackwell.

Rorty, Richard (1982) Consequences of Pragmatism (Essays: 1972-1980). Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.

Rorty, Richard (1986) The Northcliffe Lectures on 'Metaphor': 'The Contingency of Language', 'The Contingency of Community', 'The Contingency of Selfhood', London Review of Books 8 no.7 (17 April): 3-6; 8 no.8 (8 May): 11-15; 8 no.13 (24 July): 10-14.

Rothschild, Lord (1971) A Framework for Government Research and Development. CMND4814 HMSO.

Rustin, M. (1982) 'A socialist consideration of Kleinian psychoanalysis'. New Left Review 131 (Jan/Feb): 71-96.

Rustin, M. (1989) 'Post-Kleinian psychoanalysis and the post-modern' New Left Review 173 (Jan/Feb) 109-128.

Schneider, M. (1975) Neurosis and Civilization. NY: Seabury Press.

Stocking, W. Jr. (1985) 'Philanthropoids and vanishing cultures: Rockefeller funding and the end of the museum era', in Stocking, ed., Objects and Others: Essays on Museums and Material Culture, History of Anthropology vol. 3, Madison: University of Wisconsin Press. pp. 112-145.

Sutherland, J.D. (1989) Fairbairn's Journey into the Interior. Free Association Books.

Watson, J.D. (1968) The Double Helix. NY: Atheneum.

Whitehead, A.N. (1985) Science and the Modern World, with an Introduction by R.M. Young, Free Association Books.

Wiener, Norbert, (1989) The Human Use of Human Beings: Cybernetics and Society. Free Association Books.

Winnicott, D.W. (1951) 'Transitional objects and transitional phenomena', in Winnicott, 1982a, pp. 224-242.

Winnicott, D.W. (1952) 'Psychoses and child care', in Winnicott, 1982a, pp. 219-228.

Winnicott, D.W. (1982) Playing and Reality. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books.

Winnicott, D.W. (1982a) Through Pediatrics to Psycho-Analysis. Hogarth.

Wolfenstein, E.V. (1988) The Victims of Democracy: Malcom X and the Black Revolution. University of California Press.

Wolfenstein, E.V. (no date) 'Groundwork for a Marxist psychoanalysis', unpublished manuscript.

Wulff, M. (1946) 'Fetishism and object choice in early childhood', Psychoanalytic Quarterly 15: 450-471

Young, R.M. (1971) 'Evolutionary biology and ideology: then and now', Science Studies 1: 177-206, revised in W. Fuller, ed., The Biological Revolution. NY: Anchor, 1972, pp. 241-282.

Young, R.M. (1973) 'The human limits of nature', in J. Benthall, ed., The Limits of Human Nature. Allen Lane, pp. 235-74.

Young, R.M. (1977) 'Reconstituting technology: chips, genes, spares', Conference of Socialist Economists, Conference Papers, pp. 119-27.

Young, R.M. (1977a) 'Science is social relations', Radical Sci 5: 65-129.

Young, R.M. (1979) 'How societies constitute their knowledge', unpublished manuscript.

Young, R.M. (1979a) 'Interpreting the production of science', New Scientist (29 March), pp. 1026 -1028.

Young, R.M. (1979b) 'Science as culture', Quarto (2 December), 8.

Young, R.M. (1979c) 'Science is a labour process' Science for People 43: 31-37.

Young, R.M. (1979d) 'Why are figures so significant? The role and critique of quantification', in J. Irvine and I. Miles, eds, Demystifying Social Statistics, Pluto, pp. 63-75.

Young, R.M. (1981) 'The naturalization of value systems in the human sciences' in Problems in the Biological and Human Sciences, Block VI of Open University Course on Science and Belief from Darwin to Einstein, Milton Keynes: Open University Press, pp. 63-110.

Young, R.M. (1985) 'Darwinism is social', in Kohn, 1985. Princeton, pp. 609-38.

Young, R.M. (1985a) Darwin's Metaphor: Nature's Place in Victorian Culture. Cambridge University Press.

Young, R.M. (1985b) 'Is nature a labour process?' in L. Levidow and R.M. Young, eds,Science Technology and the Labour Process vol. 2, pp. 206-232.

Young, R.M. (1986) 'The dense medium: television as technology', Political Papers 13: 3-5.

Young, R.M. (1986a) 'Introduction' in L. Levidow, ed, Radical Science Essays. Free Association Books, pp. 1-15.

Young, R.M. (1987) 'Darwin and the genre of biography', in G. Levine, ed., One Culture: Essays in Science and Literature. Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, pp. 203-24.

Young, R.M. (1988) 'Biography: the basic discipline for human science'. Free Associations 11: 108-130.

Young, R.M. (1988a) 'Darwin', in D. Herman, ed, Late Great Britains: A Series of Six Historical Reappraisals, BBC/Brook Productions, pp. 42-54, revised and reprinted in Science as Culture 5: 71-86.

Young, R.M. (1989) 'Psychoanalytic critique of productivism', talk delivered to Cambridge Labour Students, 18 February.

Young, R.M. (1989a) 'The role of psychoanalysis and psychotherapy in the human sciences', talk delivered to Department of Experimental Psychology, University of Cambridge, 17 February.

Young, R.M. (in press) 'The mind-body problem' in G.N. Cautor et al, eds, Companion to the History of Science. Croom Helm.

Young, R.M. (in press a) 'Persons, organisms and primary qualities', in J. Moore, ed., The Humanity of Evolution: Essays in Honour of John C. Greene. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Young, R.M. (in press b) 'Post-modernism and the subject: pessimism of the will', Free Associations 16: 00-00.

Young, R.M. and Gold, M. (1982) 'A history of nature' (film), Crucible: Science in Society, Central Television to Chanel 4.

Yoxen, E. (1983) 'Life as a productive force: capitalizing upon research in molecular biology', in Levidow, L. and Young, R.M., eds, Science, Technology and the Labour Process, vol. I, pp. 66-122.

Yoxen, E. (1986) The Gene Business: Who Should Control Biotechnology?. Free Association Books.

Address for correspondence: 26 Freegrove Rd., London N7 9RQ


The Author

The Human Nature Review
Ian Pitchford and Robert M. Young - Last updated: 28 May, 2005 02:29 PM

US -

Amazon.com logo

UK -

Amazon.co.uk logo

 | Human Nature | Books and Reviews | The Human Nature Daily Review | Search |