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SCHOLARSHIP AND THE HISTORY OF THE BEHAVIOURAL SCIENCES
ROBERT M. YOUNG, Cambridge University
In the last few years, studies in a number of related fields have achieved a kind of coherence-and even status-as a scholarly discipline which has come to be called 'history of the behavioural sciences'. But it is not yet clear just what sort of discipline this is or what sort of status it merits. It is something like the history of medicine in that its domain, its practitioners, and its standards are very differently conceived and evaluated in different quarters. Neither the parent sciences nor the history of science have been very enthusiastic in fostering this development. This article is an attempt first to review some recent publications in the field and then to consider the ways in which professional historians of science and students of the history of the behavioural sciences can benefit from a greater awareness of one another's activities.
The last three years has seen the publication of four general works in the history of psychology. The autobiography and selected papers of Professor Edwin G. Boring, the doyen of the field, have also appeared, and he has co-edited a valuable collection of readings. Finally, since interest and activity in this field of research have reached a level which justifies a specialist periodical, the Journal of the history of the behavioral sciences began publication in January, 1965.
The editorship of this journal shows that the domain of 'history of the behavioural sciences' is much wider than psychology itself. It has editors in psychology, neurology; neurophysiology, psychiatry, psychoanalysis, sociology, anthropology, and history, for since psychology grew historically out of philosophy, medicine and biology, the boundaries of the history of the behavioural sciences cannot be firmly fixed. The two main links of the discipline with traditional science are through the evolutionary continuity of man with lower organisms and through the fact that the brain is the organ of the mind. Given these two principles, the catchment area of research in this field is vast. Indeed, if we restrict ourselves only to works listed in the history of psychology, we find that the Psychological index and Psychological abstracts had over 328,000 entries between 1894 and 1958. If we complemented this with similar listings from related fields, we should have some conception of the wide range of interests represented. The aim of the present review is not to attempt anything like a comprehensive history of recent work in all these fields, but to discuss a few books and articles and to consider the light which these throw on the state of scholarship in this rather nebulously-bounded field.
As Watson points out in his preface to The great psychologists: "The history of psychology from the period of the pre-Socratic Greeks through the Middle Ages has not been examined for over fifty years". The history of psychology from the renaissance to the 19th century is less neglected, while the 19th and 20th centuries have received most attention. Meanwhile scholars in other fields have brought to light new materials and new interpretations. Watson has in this book attempted a one-volume history of psychology from Thales to J. B. Watson, which takes account of this research. He has read much more widely in the secondary literature of the histories of science and philosophy than his predecessors, and this allows him to make a greater number of references to the biographies and intellectual contexts of the 'great psychologists'. Unfortunately he has not referred as often to the primary sources as to these general works and is therefore at the mercy of authorities whose opinions he usually reproduces without comment or qualification. There are two obvious ways out of this difficulty. The first is to undertake new research in the primary literature. In a work of wide scope, this could be only partially achieved. The alternative is to draw on detailed studies in the periodical literature. The author could have done this with respect to the histories of philosophy, science and medicine. But, with rare exceptions, in the history of psychology the requisite detailed studies do not exist. Indeed Watson largely conceived and now edits the first journal which is designed to provide an outlet for the studies on which a general work of this sort necessarily depends. There is therefore no way out of the inadequacies of this survey but to undertake new research.
As its title implies, The great psychologists is based on the 'great man' theory of history. I must confess that I am so unsympathetic to this view that I cannot abide by the injunction to evaluate a book in terms of its author's aims. Watson says: "In emphasising the 'brilliant steps forward' of a few great psychologists, therefore, I have had to neglect the work of many others who contributed to the steady advance of the field. A chapter on the work of one man in comparison to a hundred years dismissed in a few pages, serves as an inevitable, but necessary distortion of history". This is, of course, the 'whom to worship?' view of the history of science, and its limitations have been very effectively criticised in a recent monograph by Agassi. Undoubtedly an important part of the historian's task is to identify the main contributions to his field. Similarly, he is interested in the biography and intellectual development of important figures. But having found the ideas and those who have, made important contributions to their development, he must present and critically examine them. Above all he must consider their historical development. If the worship of men gets in the way of the history of scientific ideas, then one would rather see interesting biographical material sacrificed than to undermine the study of the history of science itself. It would be a radical and retrograde step to separate biography and intellectual development from the history of scientific ideas, but a surgical separation of these approaches would be preferable to hero worship.
Watson's plan provides us with extremely interesting biographical essays, but the logic of problems cannot conform to a 'great man' treatment. He tacitly admits this in his later chapters, where he is in greater control of his materials: from Fechner onwards he departs increasingly from his programme. Even so the fundamental plan of the work prevents any sense of science as a community activity involving traditions, persistent problems and assumptions, and multiple influences. A sense of the continuity of history is sorely lacking. Influences are mentioned retrospectively, but not prospectively. An Alexandrian physician (p. 76) and Spinoza (p. 159) have a "modern ring". Conversely, later views are sometimes said to be reminiscent of earlier ones. These statements may exemplify the principle of association of ideas, but they are not helpful to the historian unless their meaning is analysed in some detail. Above all they fail to respect the way problems were seen at the time, and the whole approach falsifies the way history actually happened.
The chapters on Greek, Roman and mediaeval psychology suffer from incomplete mastery of the primary sources, and the footnotes confirm the impression one derives from the text. It is the chapter on Descartes that provides the first convincing evidence of original research and independent judgment. The remainder of the book covers familiar-one might say too familiar-ground, except for the chapter on J. B. Watson, whose shadow is cast over all current research in psychology. The author gives us the poignant story of J. B. Watson's later life, after a scandal in his private affairs had led to his dismissal from his chair at Johns Hopkins and he was unable to get an academic post anywhere else. The discussion of J. B. Watson's scientific work is also among the best chapters in the book. The bibliography, though impressive, is marred by inconvenient organisation, lack of page references, and citations which are often incomplete.
Rather than make detailed criticisms (e.g. a confusion about Aristotle's doctrine of four causes, p. 50), I should like to ask why such prodigious effort has produced such a disappointing result. In fairness one should stress that this book was initially intended as a popular account of the history of psychology, and that its aims changed while it was being written. As a result a book which had been intended for laymen and undergraduates became, under the author's hand, a work of serious scholarship. Nevertheless one finds that the discussion is too often cut off as soon as complexities arise; exciting men and issues become pale and flat. This is true even of the author's rather sanguine treatment of Freud. The reason most decidedly is not to be found in any failure of care, competence or dedication of the author. Rather, this book is. symptomatic of the shortcomings of the history of psychology as it has been written by psychologists in the last four decades. In a way it is the inevitable result of a number of attitudes and practices which the present writer hopes that this review may bring under scrutiny. It will quite properly be objected that I have said that this book should not have been attempted, or, if attempted, should have been done along entirely different lines. In fact, I understand that Professor Watson is at work on a book based on trends, not men. For reasons given in this article, I do not believe that such a book can be successful in the present state of our knowledge. The obvious question which will be asked about The great psychologists is whether or not it should be classed with Brett, Boring, and Murphy as a standard general treatment. The short answer must be 'no', but it should be remembered that the author never intended that it should be such. A more considered reply would be that the question is misconceived. It will be some time before the research has been conducted which will make it feasible to attempt a survey of the history of psychology, unless one is prepared to continue indefinitely to accept works based on a wholly inadequate corpus of scholarship. Watson's book must therefore stand as an important justification for the journal which he now edits. In 1929 Boring remarked sadly that in experimental psychology "The habit of writing complete text-books in the face of incomplete knowledge still persists".4 This might well serve as a text or injunction in the history of psychology in the present.
Before concluding my remarks on this book, I should stress that one can learn a great deal from Watson's treatment. My review copy contains many more underlinings and notes for future reference than indications of the book's shortcomings.5
A short history of British psychology by L. S. Hearnshaw is in some respects the opposite of Watson's book. Its scope is restricted to British work between 1840 and 1940, and it is based on a wide reading of primary sources and refrains from perpetuating the dubious judgments of other commentators, so that it is almost wholly original and is in fact the only recent study written without heavy reliance on the work of Boring. The author's aims are modest: "This short history is intended for the general reader as well as for students of psychology. It is only an outline, and aims in the first place to bring out broad trends rather than to introduce an excessive load of minute and technical detail. Enough detail has, I hope, been included to give the book some substance without being unduly specialised".
This is not primarily a history of scientific ideas. Like Watson, Hearnshaw is more concerned with the importance of men than with the nature of their thought. The book is written in the form of a series of independent essays of varying lengths: biographical and intellectual sketches of men and milieux. Although these include lucid critical essays on Ward, Stout, McDougall and Spearman, one feels that his treatment is usually insufficiently expository or insufficiently analytical. Hearnshaw is at his best in discussing the development of the discipline of psychology: societies, fashions, legislation. It has been said by those who know certain events intimately that he often errs in matters of detail, nuance and interpretation, but it remains true that he has provided the most complete account of the profession of psychology in Britain that has been published. The topical chapters dealing with aspects of psychology related to social history-social, abnormal and applied psychology are extremely informative, although the discussions of philosophical matters are less successful.
The national restriction allows treatment of some figures whose work is regularly-and often wrongly-ignored in more general works: William Carpenter, Thomas Laycock, Henry Maudsley, George H. Lewes, Hughlings Jackson, David Ferrier, H. C. Bastian, Henry Head and Sir John Lubbock. The introduction of the se and other names into the secondary literature is one of the main merits of the book. When coupled with Hearnshaw's charming style, each of his brief essays invites further study. The selected bibliography provides an excellent introduction to the relevant literature, and one hopes that this book will serve as an invitation to others to conduct the sort of detailed, circumscribed studies on which the future of the study of the history of psychology depends.
George A. Miller's Psychology: the science of mental life is a modest work of a different sort. It is an introductory science textbook which treats the subject historically. He considers topics in the historical order in which they became interesting and alternates these with biographical essays on Wundt, James, Galton, Pavlov, Freud and Binet. The book makes no claim to scholarly originality and, as the author acknowledges in his dedication and preface, it owes heavy debts to Boring for information, encouragement and criticism. The merits of the book lie in its clarity and in the encouragement which it may provide to students to pursue historical issues more seriously.
Psychology in the making poses special problems for the reviewer. Its sub-title is misleading: "Histories of Selected Research Problems". Its avowed approach is that of a series of case histories. Yet the book is neither history nor case studies if one considers the standard set by Conant's Harvard case histories in experimental science. Instead we have a collection of extremely interesting review articles which extend further back in time than is usual. These were composed by a "group of faculty members of the Department of Psychology at Berkeley who found that they shared an interest in the historical development of psychological ideas". In order to discuss its contents here, it will be necessary to defer treatment of one of the most interesting features of this book: the fact that its authors were under the impression that they were indulging their interests in "the historical development of psychological ideas". For the result is an excellent example of the uncertainty about just what historical scholarship is, which will be discussed below. In particular, the first chapter, "Some Guides to the Understanding of the History of Psychology", provides ample evidence for the conclusion that the aims of historical studies in this field are not at all clearly defined.
The chapter on "Cortical Localization of Function" is the only one which attempts to follow the case-history method and shows conclusively that there is no further need for articles on cerebral localization which survey developments solely in terms of the work of Gall, Flourens, Broca, Jackson, Fritsch and Hitzig, Bartholow, Ferrier, Sherrington, Franz, Lashley and Penfield. Thanks to at least a dozen more or less interchangeable accounts, we know enough about this over-simplified view of the history of cerebral localization. Further research should deepen our understanding of individual figures and broaden the scope of inquiry to include others. In the nineteenth century cerebral localization became the focus of the problems of relating mind to brain and of finding a catalogue of functions which could integrate subjective life, physiology, and the biological study of adaptation. It remains an important topic and deserves new research, whereas in the past decade articles on this subject have degenerated into story-telling of the venerable tale.
The remaining chapters, though certainly not history, provide very interesting materials for the future historian. As such they are more valuable than surveys which merely repeat old knowledge and undertake no new research. Each of the contributors has presented a review of a circumscribed problem on which he is engaged in active research. Each chapter is based on a close study of a number of primary sources, usually, beginning the first experimental work on the problem. References to pre-experimental writing (except, perhaps, in the case of Hochberg on perception) are desultory and unenlightening. Since the book is a collection of essays with no unifying theme, the chapters will be considered in turn.
G. McClearn on the inheritance of behaviour is extremely disappointing. There are no details about the eighteenth-century debate, and the narrative jumps from Linnaeus to a very crude presentation of Lamarck.8 Erasmus Darwin is ignored, and Herbert Spencer is mentioned only in passing, although these two provided important contributions to the history of assumptions on the matter. There is insufficient stress on the significance of the change in Darwin's views from belief in natural selection to use-inheritance, although this issue is crucial for psychology. The author has missed an important opportunity to consider the debate on this issue between 1855 and 1900 in the writings of Spencer, Darwin, Wallace and Romanes, among others, even though two of the principals have provided excellent guides to the controversy. Instead of availing himself of an opportunity to contribute original research, the author provides a lengthy summary of classical genetics-information which is obtainable in any elementary textbook. The same is true of his discussion of the intelligence quotient (IQ) and mental defects, as well as his presentation of the oft-told tale of the Jukes and the Kallikaks.
In his discussion of nativism and empiricism in perception, J. E. Hochberg has paid more careful attention to earlier works. He provides an adequate exposition of Berkeley, but one still finds evidence of insufficient familiarity with the issues. Locke's theory of ideas is referred to as "this materialist philosophy" (p. 259), and the concept of reflex is applied to Descartes without the qualifications necessary to guard against anachronism (p. 272). James Mill is presented from the 1869 edition, which had been greatly altered by his son and Bain forty years after the original appeared. The discussion of the empiricists and associationists on perception is superficial, and these early sections are written in the style of a bed-time story. The exposition becomes patronising with Helmholtz, but this is followed by a careful review of a number of Gestalt experiments. The remainder of the chapter is mainly concerned with perception of depth or space and is serious and competent. Hochberg argues that the progress of research has finally made the nature-nurture dichotomy passé (pp. 317-326). He considers the work before about, 1950 devoid of "full-fledged psychophysical research in human and animal space perception..."
When the study of the history of utilitarianism and hedonism comes to consider the behavioural theories which were their heirs in experimental psychology, two papers of Leo Postman (who also edited the whole volume) will provide important materials: his chapter on rewards and punishments in human learning and his earlier article on the history and present status of the law of effect. These studies are complemented by an earlier review by Waters  and can be connected with the nineteenth-century British tradition by reference to Cason,  whose study extends back to the theories of Spencer, Bain and J. M. Baldwin. In this chapter Postman ignores everything written before 1898. We are told only that "Philosophical discussions of rewards and punishments as regulators of human conduct have had a long and time-honoured history". (p. 331). We are provided with an excellent exposition of the classical work of E. L. Thorndike and a close analysis of selected experiments which influenced the subsequent vicissitudes of his theory, but Postman devotes less attention to work based on the conditioning paradigm, and a future historian will need to look further into the work of Skinner on reinforcement and operant conditioning. He will also need to concern himself with the extensive literature on the conditioning of verbal behaviour, which has itself recently led to the establishment of yet another specialist journal.
The contribution by D. A. Riley is concerned with work on memory of form. He begins with the experiments of Friedrich Wulf (1922) and then discusses subsequent research in the light of Wulf's Gestalt view. (For earlier work a beginning may be made by consulting the, useful historical compilation of Gomulicki.) A reading of Riley's meticulous exposition and analysis of experiments bearing on Wulf's theory should help any layman to develop a very healthy respect for the special problems of experimental control and isolation of significant variables in psychological research. The particular issue is one of the least complex in psychology, but the myriad interpretations and objections to each experiment show just how difficult it is to do science about matters which are concerned with subjective meaning. Of all the chapters in the book Riley's is the most limited in scope, but I found it very cogently argued and consistently absorbing in spite of its initially unpromising subject.
After devoting only five pages to the period between Plato and 1890, R. D. Tuddenham tells a fascinating story of work on the nature and measurement of intelligence. His account is a clear testimony to the need for new categories of analysis in psychology to replace the ones inherited from philosophical psychology-reason, memory, imagination, judgment, etc. The least promising category seems to be the one under review: general intelligence. The catalogues produced by the multiple factor analysts have the merit of having been subjected to empirical testing, but the ever-growing list of so-called 'basic mental abilities' suggests that psychology is still far from having an agreed set of basic units. Three references are given, which list 59, 40, and 120 basic abilities respectively. This makes the position of physics enviable, no matter how its table of fundamental particles grows, while the periodic table of elements of the chemists seems a very distant analogy indeed. Philosophers must help psychologists to decide if this is a purely empirical problem or an aspect of a more general issue in the biological sciences, whereby the analysis of functions may never produce a fixed, final set of variables for the interpretation of the adaptation of organisms to their environments. Tuddenham touches on this issue in his concluding remarks. He makes the premise. "that intelligence is not an entity, nor even a dimension in a person, but rather an evaluation of a behavior sequence (or the average of any such), from the point of view of its adaptive adequacy. What constitutes intelligence depends upon what the situation demands, though we add precision (along with bits of anthropocentrism) by restricting the term to evaluation of behavior involving the manipulation of symbols" (p. 517).
In their discussion of repression, D. W. MacKinnon and W. F. Dukes begin with an elementary and rather uncritical exposition of Freud. It is surprising to find Rapaport's classical review of work on Emotions and memory missing from their discussion and their bibliography; experiments on repression was one of his chief concerns. Nevertheless MacKinnon and Duke provide an informative study of attempts to bring repression ("the foundation stone of the psychoanalytic theory") into the laboratory over the protests of the psychoanalysts. It appears that the topic became experimentally respectable by changing its name to "perceptual defence" and then being purged of its defence aspect (p. 273). Attempts are being made to reunite recent experiments with their psychoanalytic forbears (pp. 730-731). The final chapter by T. R. Sarbin considers attempts to understand hypnotic phenomena. Its heavy reliance on secondary sources reminds one that what has been interesting in this volume is not its historical content but the material it provides for a future historian. Thus Sarbin provides a useful exposition of Braid's work, but one is more interested in his own advocacy of the "social-psychological" nature of hypnotic phenomena.
The illuminating treatments of the literature given in the chapters of Psychology in the making are valuable and interesting in themselves. From an historical point of view, however, their utility lies in the evidence they provide to help one to understand how active research workers saw these problems in the mid-twentieth century. A future historiographer may also be interested in what this volume indicates about the status of genuine historical studies in psychology in the same period. Judging from this book, history is apparently synonymous with review articles which consider some references that do not bear directly on the experiments in hand.
An earlier reviewer of Boring's selected papers has said that he has given form and meaning to the growth of experimental psychology, possibly more than any other man in this century. This is certainly true. As the editors point out, Boring's "monumental History of Experimental Psychology is the standard text and reference source throughout the world. Sensation and Perception in the History of Experimental Psychology is the most thoroughly documented account of this particular field". The works by Watson and Miller reviewed above are dedicated to Boring. The invitation to contribute his autobiography and selected essays to the "Contemporary Men of Science Series" attests to the distinction of his career, which was further recognized by a gold medal awarded by the American Psychological Foundation, whose citation mentions seven areas of contribution to psychology. It was as a tribute to Boring that Watson and Campbell assembled History, Psychology and science: selected papers. Finally, it is altogether fitting that Boring contributed the first article to the new journal, which his own research has done so much to .inspire and to make necessary. Nothing said here should be construed as diminishing the sense of debt which every beginner in the history of psychology owes to him: his contribution is nonpareil. But it must be stressed that the worst way to repay intellectual debts is to repeat the findings of one's mentors rather than extending, amending, and deepening them.
Psychologist at large contains Boring's autobiography, some letters, and 43 pieces of varying lengths which were drawn from his bibliography of over 500 items. The book includes scientific, historical, and theoretical articles, plus a number of editorials, obituaries, and occasional pieces. One might have hoped that Boring's papers would provide the detailed studies from which his general histories were distilled. Some of these pieces are the notebooks for his books but most are occasional essays, with the bulk of the information having been drawn from his books to illuminate their respective topics. As such, these are all interesting documents in the history of the history of psychology and are also revealing. Some are original, but most are examples of the perseveration which seems to afflict this field.
Three of the essays are of particular interest to historians. "The Nature of History of Experimental Control" provides an introduction to an issue which should be explored more fully. The same is true of the complementary essays on "The Beginning and Growth of Measurement in Psychology" and "A History of Introspection". Each of these absorbing but impressionistic pieces could serve as the outline for an extremely interesting monograph. Boring's papers-like his books-identify significant issues, figures and works, while none of his studies is ultimately satisfactory. One is always urged by them to pursue the matter more deeply and systematically. This, of course, is a great tribute to his role as inspiration and teacher. He has done an immense service in showing which books are important: now we must study them. His own writings have been more in the form of essays than critical expositions involving close textual analysis. His occasional pieces are always informative and entertaining, and it is perhaps unfair to object to the repetition of examples in papers which have been brought together from very diverse occasions and only incidentally appear between the covers of one book. Nevertheless one does tire of references to 1879 and the founding of Wundt's laboratory, to the Bell-Magendie controversy, to Fechner's inspiration and, above all, to the ever-present 'Zeitgeist'.
The only essay to appear in both volumes is "Human Nature vs. Sensation: William James and the Psychology of the Present", in which Boring used the centenary of James's birth as an occasion for a discussion of the issues raised by the dichotomy between a humanist or phenomenological approach (James) and the reductionist or positivist one which Boring then advocated. He makes no attempt to resolve the issue between students of 'human nature' and those of stimulus and response. This essay serves as an introduction to Boring's theoretical articles on psychophysics and operationism. I find these pieces more original and more satisfying than his historical work. In the period between 1913 and 1940, experimental psychologists were carrying on a difficult balancing act with traditional psychophysics, the structuralist-functionalist debate, the aggressive claims of behaviourism and operationism, and the hypotheses of Gestalt psychology. The basic problem was what to do about consciousness and 'meaning' in a science which was ostensibly about objective phenomena which must be measured. Boring was generally on the side of the reductionists, but he did not share J. B. Watson's, aggressive ignorance and philosophical naiveté. In this period Boring wrote a series of studies for which one is extremely grateful. The first is on the physiology of consciousness, and is a summary of his book on The physical dimensions of consciousness which has itself recently been reprinted. In "Psychophysiological Systems and Isomorphic Relations" one can almost feel the anguish of Psychophysicists and Gestalt psychologists as they attempt to be scientific about matters which Cartesian dualism and the doctrine of primary and secondary qualities preclude from the domain of science. In the following paper Boring attempts a reductionist solution which involves an abrogation of private consciousness, a reduction of its function to discrimination which is, in turn, considered in purely neural terms. I find his proposed solution unclear and unsatisfactory, but it is a useful document in the history of the debate. The most enlightening of these articles is an earlier one on "The Stimulus-Error" in which he distils the course of debate on psychophysics and recalls that Cartesian dualism precludes quantification of mental events, while scientific psychology necessarily depends on some version of just such measurement. In general one may say that Boring's theoretical papers on the mind-body problem are symptoms of rather than solutions to the problems raised by the new methods and assumptions of behaviourism and operationism. These articles, like those in Psychology in the making, will serve historians as materials for historical research, whereas Boring's historical writings are valuable guides to further research.
Two of Boring's essays are intensely personal. The autobiographical piece, "Psychologist at Large", and the story of his brief psychoanalysis are brutally honest accounts of his "search for maturity". As such they are sometimes immodest and even embarrassing. Different readers will react differently to his openness but, whatever their response, it would be difficult not to respect him for making revelations which few men would be brave enough to place at the disposal of potentially unkind critics. Freud was careful not to do so in his autobiography, and he resented the fact that he had found it necessary to reveal much of himself in his psychoanalytic writings. When Herbert Spencer revealed too much of himself one reader remarked: "It seems impossible that the opinions of a man who depicts himself as the glorified quintessence of a prig can be worth anything". William James was no less unkind. The only document which tempted me to this sort of response was an unnecessarily tactless and patronising letter to Professor Bartlett about British psychology.
This letter, together with Boring's remarks on his relations with Titchener, leads on to an important matter of interpretation in Boring's writings. He tells us that Titchener was his hero and that his "image has always dominated my professional life". Boring systematically provides a relatively greater emphasis on German influences on American psychology at the expense of the British. He places heavy weight on the "founding" of experimental psychology by Wundt and on the introduction of measurement in psychophysics and introspective studies. He is also concerned with the training of students, which certainly did owe more to the "new psychology" in Germany. One feels that Boring is more at home in this tradition and the writings of Fechner, Helmholtz and Wundt, than in the parallel British work. As he recognizes, the assumptions of the "new psychology" were derived from British empiricism and associationism. He also acknowledges the influence of Bain, Spencer and Darwin in providing the bases of functionalism: associationism, evolutionism and emphasis on learning as a consequence of what organisms do. But the chapters in his History of experimental psychology on the period from Locke to Spencer, and his essay on "The Influence of Evolutionary Theory upon American Psychological Thought", are among the least original of his contributions. In particular Boring has failed to grasp the full significance of Bain's emphasis on motion in the history of associationism. It was a crucial factor in the transition from a primarily sensationalist view, which grew out of the origins of association in epistemology, to a new interest in learning as the result of sensations consequent upon motion. The subsequent history of this view in Thorndike's 'law of effect', the functionalism of James and Dewey, Watson's behaviourism, and the concept of 'operant' in Skinner is relatively well-understood. But historians have failed to relate Bain's influence on pragmatism with the assumptions of functional psychology. As Peirce said, Bain's criterion of belief- "that upon which a man is prepared to act"-was urged on the members of the Cambridge, Massachusetts 'Metaphysical Club' by Nicholas St John Green. Peirce continues: "From this definition, pragmatism is scarce more than a corollary; so I am disposed to think of him as the grandfather of pragmatism". We need a much more careful study of Bain's influence upon the concomitant development of functionalist psychology. After all, James was the main inspiration of both functionalism and pragmatism.
Bain prefaced his work on The senses and the intellect with a statement of how far his analysis went beyond the traditional doctrine of the muscle sense: ". . . . I have thought it proper to assign to Movement and the feeling of Movement a position preceding the sensations of the senses; and have endeavoured to prove that the exercise of active energy originating in purely internal impulses, independent of the stimulus produced by outward impression, is a primary factor of our constitution". As he developed his argument, he urged that the muscle sense and movement are fundamentally important: ". . . . action is a more intimate and inseparable property of our constitution than any of our sensations, and in fact enters as a component part into every one of the senses, giving them the character of compounds, while itself is a simple and elementary property"  Spontaneous movements, he held, are a feature of nervous activity prior to and independent of sensations. The acquired linkages of spontaneous movements, with the pleasures and pains consequent upon them, educate the organism so that its formerly random movements become adapted to ends or purposes. He defined volition as this compound of spontaneous movements and feelings . In his theory, the co-ordination of motor impulses into definitive purposive movement results from the association of ideas with them. He argued that no previous "writer on the human mind" had put forward this concept of spontaneous actions and their connection with voluntary actions; "but the following interesting extracts from the great physiologist, Müller, will show that he has been forcibly impressed with the one and the other of these views" . If one traces this doctrine through the writing of Müller, it will be found that his motor theory is an elaboration of conceptions in Erasmus Darwin's Zoonomia (1894-6) and that these, in turn, are developed from Hartley's Observations on man (1749). These developments certainly deserve much more careful study. While the association psychology retained a bias toward sensation, concomitant developments were occurring in biology and physiology which, when reintegrated with associationism in the work of Bain, led to a fundamental change of emphasis which was basic to the emergence of the modern pre-occupation with behaviour as the primary subject matter of psychology.
Why has this issue been ignored? An important reason, one feels, is that readers (though not Boring himself) consider his History of experimental Psychology definitive. He says that he does not propose to abstract Bain's systematic treatises. He then goes on to say of Bain that "It is also probable that he did not know Müller's psychological physiology". Boring bases this allegation on Bain's ignorance of German. It was, of course, Baly's translation of Müller that Bain quoted as an important part of the background of his motor theory. This is the central argument of Bain's systematic treatise on the will and his most important and influential contribution to the association psychology. There are innumerable references to Müller in both volumes of Bain's major work, beginning with table of contents.
Enough has been said to indicate that the work of Edwin G. Boring is at the centre of both the achievements and the limitations of the history of psychology as a scholarly discipline. Two comments in his writings symbolise the problems involved. When he had published the second edition of his History of experimental psychology, Boring tells us that his pet fear was that people would say, "but anyone can write history. Can he not do research?"36 The introductory chapters of most histories of psychology echo this defensive view, while the writings of many who do research as their primary activity and history as a pastime should reassure Boring that his fear has little foundation. On the other hand, those who have used Boring as a definitive work have done a great disservice to the historical analysis of the behavioural sciences. The editor's introduction to the second edition of Boring's History of experimental Psychology says: "It seems difficult to believe that anyone will again deem it necessary to undertake as meticulous and definitive a history of experimental psychology's early period as Boring here gives us. He has steeped himself in his subject as no one else ever will". There is much justice in this claim. But the study of the history of psychology has suffered mightily from those who have taken it literally. It may be useful to give one more example of the sort of 'inverted pyramid' which results from part-time historical scholars who mistake secondary sources for primary ones.
The pseudo-science of phrenology played an important part in the development of psychology as a biological science. One of the ways in which phrenology helped to develop a naturalistic interpretation of the mental functions of animals and men was by challenging the prevailing view of the fundamental variables in behaviour. Philosophical psychology had passed down the abstract categories of reason, memory, will, intelligence and so on. Franz Joseph Gall questioned these categories and asserted that the study of the functions of the brain depended upon the study of animals in their environments and of men in society. It was only by this method, Gall argued, that we could arrive at a meaningful set of categories. It is therefore of considerable interest that Gall's faculties bear a verbal resemblance to those of the Scottish faculty psychologists, Reid, Stewart and (to some extent), Brown. In 1935, Spoerl wrote an article which considered the importance of Gall's analysis for contemporary debates on 'faculties versus traits'. Spoerl shows that the verbal similarity between Gall's faculties and those of Reid and Stewart is superficial and that they were conceived on an entirely different basis. The Scots were concerned with mind in general, whereas Gall was only interested in those faculties which were determinate of individual and species differences. Spoerl goes on to consider the charge that Gall borrowed his catalogue of faculties from the Scots. He notes that Stewart published after Gall and argues that it appears that "Gall had no knowledge of the Scottish faculty psychology". He also shows that Gall did not borrow from the Wolffian faculty psychology. Indeed, he specifically repudiated it. In the second edition of his History of experimental psychology, Boring refers to this article. He says: "Modern psychology has largely failed to establish any such units, but Gall had ready for use the faculties of the Scottish School. . . . It was from the lists of Thomas Reid and Dugald Stewart that Gall obtained his analysis of the mind into 37 power and propensities". He says later that Spoerl ". . . shows how Gall got his list of faculties from Reid and Stewart in the Scottish School". This was a simple mistake of memory, and we all make such mistakes. I confess that I have not made a careful study of the fate of this small point, but in the preparation of this review I have found it repeated in three places in Boring's writings. It also appears in two of the works whose authors praise Boring lavishly.
One could go on indefinitely citing such simple mistakes, omissions, and interpretations with which one disagrees. For example, in his history of reflex action, Boring ignores the contributions of Laycock and Carpenter. More serious is the omission of the neurological and psychological theories of Hughlings Jackson and their significant influences on Sherrington and Freud, to say nothing of the whole tenor of modern neurology. In the same vein he ignores the careful historical research of Henry Head on Gall and on the subsequent history of aphasia, although he devotes considerable space to these topics. I have not compared the two editions of the History of experimental psychology systematically, but it is certainly clear that Boring failed to take account of a great deal of important historical research in the period which elapsed between 1929 and 1950. For example, he takes no account of the work of Owsei Temkin on phrenology, Magendie, or French and German materialism. Nor does he consider the classical English source on Magendie. The work of this physiologist was basic to the development of the paradigm which still dominates experimental psychology. Boring has reminded us that for the scientist accuracy is closely allied to honesty. This is true of the history of science also, and Boring is far from the worst of those professional psychologists who do historical research as a part-time activity.
It has seemed necessary to give these examples, not because of any feelings we or the emperor may have about his clothes, but because of the activities of those who admire them in a completely unqualified and uncritical way. The time has come to insist upon rigorous standards of scholarship in the history of the behavioural sciences. The field has all of the trappings of a valid scholarly discipline; like history of science in general, it has passed through the useful but limited stage of amateurism. The history of physical science is well beyond this point, and the history of the biological sciences is approaching it. The history of the behavioural sciences has not yet reached the point where most of its practitioners have become self-consciously critical. The limitations which were inevitable in pioneering work such as that of Boring should now be eliminated, for Professor Boring's achievement is such that his work can easily afford to have such limitations pointed out. The numerous examples which one could give of the work of others would not leave their reputations intact. At the moment the standards of scholarship in the history of the behavioural sciences lie somewhere between those in the history of medicine and those in the general history of science. Indeed, it may be that the history of medicine is already beginning to transcend the amateurism which was so prevalent until recently.
Studies in the history of the behavioural sciences suffer from two severe handicaps. The first is the mixed blessing of the available secondary sources. The second is the apparent inability to decide what sort of enquiry history of the behavioural sciences is. Is it an adjunct to laboratory work? A charming avocation? Or a research discipline whose standards must be as high as those practised in the laboratory? The available secondary sources have limitations about which their authors are quite clear, but those who use them have not taken them seriously enough. Brett's three-volume History of psychology (1912-21) provided an excellent survey of the history of psychology, with primary emphasis on its development within philosophy. Boring was primarily concerned with the emergence of experimental psychology in the period between 1860 and 1910, and no other historian has considered as many of the relevant works as he did. His mastery of research on sensation and perception is unique. Murphy considered his work to be an introductory text, and as such it is extremely useful. Nevertheless, a scholarly tradition which is based primarily on textbooks has severe inherent limitations. If one began one's research in the history of psychology from Boring's footnotes, one would find a very exciting catalogue of unanswered questions. But the tendency has been to learn from the text and not from the footnotes. That is, the prevailing mode of analysis in the history of the behavioural sciences is one of writing expository history and leaving out the loose ends and provocative questions which stimulate research. Expository history has a justification after the problems have been examined and the critical debates which study of the primary sources engender are well along. An excellent example of this is Passmore's work on the recent history of philosophy. This position is far from having been reached in the history of the behavioural sciences. The monograph and journal literature is simply of insufficient volume and quality.
Didactic, expository history takes the view that there is a little story to be told. The problem of the historian is to find the facts and report them in a readable and accurate fashion. This view is related to an extraordinarily naive positivism which permeates much of the writing of experimental psychologists when they indulge in historical inquiries. It is sometimes made explicit when the term 'philosophical' is used synonymously with 'speculative'. It is implied in the way people write-making a gesture to the pre-experimental literature as a sort of literary gloss before getting down to the serious part of an article. Although his work is usually free from this, Boring indulges in this sort of thinking in seeking to establish when experimental psychology was 'founded'. Kuhn has reminded us just how much we lose when we approach history as "chroniclers of an incremental process". In the physical sciences this approach has shown itself to be unfruitful. Indeed, it is clear that this is simply the wrong sort of question to ask.49 History, like science, is controversy, not story-telling. The failure to take this point is shown more clearly in the occasional pieces which grace the beginning of every scientific symposium, and every opening of a new institute. These pieces are often of bibliographical use, but they are obviously written by scientists in a hurry. The result is variable-often appalling and occasionally just acceptable. What is missing, once again, is original research.
One has very mixed feelings about the endeavours of experimental psychologists, and other scientists concerned with brain and behaviour, in writing the history of their respective disciplines. Such writings provide a sense of relevance to contemporary research which is of considerable use to historians, and for this one is extremely grateful. It is difficult to imagine how these scientists can combine historical research with their experimental work, publications and textbook writing in their fields. For example, to deride Boring for not being the 'compleat' historian would be to ignore the 500 items in his bibliography. In fact, he wrote his historical volumes in his summer vacations, and few avocations can have been more fruitful. My argument is not aimed at working psychologists who make contributions to the history of psychology. Rather is it aimed at those who think that this is enough. Although professional physicists and biologists have made significant contributions to the histories of their sciences (and some have even left science to devote themselves primarily to historical scholarship), important work in the history of physical sciences has mainly been done by full-time historians, and the history of biological sciences is slowly approaching this standard. The same may be said of the history of medicine, though its artificial separation from general history of science reminds one of the situation faced in psychology. If the history of psychology is to advance beyond being an avocation with very uneven standards, those professional psychologists who would contribute to scholarship must grasp the fact that the standards of historical scholarship are not less rigorous than those of experimental science. In fact, since historians are usually dealing with 'softer' data, the standards must in many ways be higher. They can make significant contributions only if they are prepared to conduct research which thoroughly covers its chosen topic. What are needed are monographs, articles of definite scope and pieces which are concerned with important figures, the historical development of concepts (see below) and other limited subjects. There should be no more general surveys for some time to come: we have reached the stage where we know enough to know not to write them until we know a great deal more.
The main barrier to the approach advocated here is, unfortunately, the attitude of part-time historians. This is made clear in the prefaces to some of the works which have appeared recently. The introductory chapter to Psychology in the making, as well as those to the works by Esper and Murphy, indicate that the writers of these books have a defensive attitude about being interested in the history of psychology at all. They are casting about for pedagogic benefits to be derived from a discipline which (if it has any justification at all) must be justified on its own terms. Having recently read the standard sources in the history of psychology in a short period, I find that this attitude permeates much of the writing in this field, giving the impression that the authors have not really devoted themselves wholeheartedly to their research. The result is surveys which show a sad absence of the intimate acquaintance with the primary sources which is a simple, basic requirement for meaningful research. The author finds that he must stop when he reaches complex and subtle issues. As a consequence, the same stories are to be told time and again, and our understanding is never deepened. Nor are we troubled by the problems which stimulate the research.
Since most books and articles in the history of the behavioural sciences have been written by working scientists for their colleagues and students, their interests and viewpoint have naturally led them to stress the history of problems of current interest. History is thus written backwards from the viewpoint of a modern textbook. It is arguable that this approach is most useful to these authors and their chosen audience, but the argument ultimately breaks down for two reasons. First, the result is shockingly bad history. The writings of other periods are considered completely out of their context, and the near mention (and often the apparent mentioning based on what is really no more than a verbal similarity-a pun) of a conception is hailed as a discovery, and history is at once played false and degenerates into the search for anticipations: 'is A buried in B's grave?' The second reason is that this approach-arguing backwards from current views denies the student one of the most valuable helps to be gained from historical reading: perspective. If we do not understand a problem in its own terms as it was seen in a different period-if, indeed, we interpret it solely in terms of our own views-then we shall lose the benefit of transcending our own assumptions and our current vantage point.
The main stream of writing of the history of science is beginning to reflect this point, and the results of this insight have been summarised by Kuhn and identified as "a historiographic revolution in the history of science, though one that is still in its early stages.... Rather than seeking the permanent contributions of an older science to our present vantage, they [historians] attempt to display the historical integrity in its own time". There is scant evidence that this approach has begun to dawn on historians of the behavioural sciences. Indeed, the references to historiography in the works under review leave a very great deal to be desired. Even in referring to Kuhn's admirable exposition of the new historiography, they betray little grasp of the implications of the demand that we understand the past in its own terms before comparing it with our own vantage point. Here, for example, is one current view of history written by an historian of psychology: "The historian charts a road through the past. He shows how one event follows another leading toward a particular state of affairs, towards a destination which he has selected and which, in turn, enables him to distinguish between important and unimportant events. He thinks backwards, always looking for antecedents, even though he usually writes forwards so as to simulate the progress of real events". One could not hope for a better summary of what recent historiography has attempted to put aside.53 Although one has reservations about aspects of the arguments of Kuhn and Agassi, a comparison between these and the writings of (for example) Boring and Watson on historiography is extremely embarrassing for the historian of the behavioural sciences. There is only one piece which has appeared in recent years which gives hope for the historiographical sophistication of historians of the behavioural sciences. A recent editorial in the new Journal of the history of the behavioral sciences by George Stocking, Jnr. provides an excellent review of the recent debate on historiography and discusses its relevance to the history of the behavioural sciences.54
The remainder of this essay will be devoted to discussing areas of research in which new work is needed and to indicating some of the sources which may be fruitful for future work.
Much work needs to be done in placing the history of the behavioural sciences within the context of the development of modern science. We have learned that the history of modern philosophy cannot be fully understood unless we interpret it in the light of the progress of science. Thus we read Hobbes, Descartes ' Locke, Hume, Leibniz and Kant in terms of the Scientific Revolution. Similarly we read Kepler, Galileo, Boyle, and Newton as scientist-philosophers who provide the essential concepts and the radical views with which the philosophers were attempting to cope. In the same way, we must learn to see the same figures as influencing and influenced by a new, approach to psychology. In his classical discussion of metaphysical foundations of modern physical science, A. E. Burtt referred to concept of mind as a convenient receptacle, for the refuse, the chips and whittlings of science, rather than a possible, object of scientific knowledge.' Twenty-five years later, this point was made again in A. G. A. Balz's sensitive Cartesian studies, where it was pointed out that psychology had to be whatever the new physics and the related metaphysics permitted it to be. Modern psychology grew, in fact, from a synthesis of views of Locke and Newton within the dualistic framework set by Descartes. But it is not the historians of psychology who have seen this. Rather it has been made clear by the writings of the scholars just mentioned and by Crombie, Vartanian, Halévy and Albee, among others, whose writings have been largely. ignored by, historians of psychology. The problems of modern psychology grew. out of and are continuous with those of the classical Scientific Revolution. Indeed their origin should be traced to the natural philosophers from Kepler to Newton and the price which they paid in order to achieve a world which could be exploited by the physico-chemical sciences. In return for a physical universe of matter and motion-of extended substances-which could be treated by geometrical, mathematical means, they pushed their main problems into the concept of mind. Those that remained were accommodated by the concepts of the Deity and the ether. Thus, Descartes, Locke, Newton, and Hartley provide the essential framework within which scientific, philosophic, and psychological problems must be seen. The branch of inquiry which can be delineated by the phrase 'history of behavioural sciences' finds its boundaries defined by the principle of continuity on the one hand and Cartesian dualism on the other, with the problem of final causes as the central issue then as now. The seventeenth-century problem of primary and secondary qualities plagues psychology in a way which is more crippling than in any other science. The psychology of perception has been most directly influenced by this and the related subject-object dualism which were codified when mind was separated from nature and this separation was made an assumption of modern scientific metaphysics. Similarly, the Cartesian framework set the boundaries for mechanistic biology, and both the reflex concept and behaviourism can trace a lineage to the physical side of Descartes's ontological dualism.
Hartley was less original than Descartes, in that his psychology was a crystallisation of ideas which derive from Locke, Gay and Newton. Nevertheless, associationism was first formulated as a systematic psychology by Hartley, and the claim that "association is the only theory of learning that has ever been proposed" is a useful starting point for qualification. In its philosophic aspects, the study of the history of the behavioural sciences is the story of attempts to transcend Cartesian dualism, the doctrine of primary and secondary qualities, and the banishment of final causes from science. The problems of epistemology and methodology in psychology turn on the ontology which was codified by Galileo, Descartes and Newton. These are not distant problems for psychology: they are very near the surface. It is no accident that those who have struggled most mightily against Cartesian dualism have been psychologists, for example Lloyd Morgan and later the Gestalt psychologists. Also, the leaders of modern psychology began their careers by taking a stand on this issue. Freud's psychophysical parallelism allowed him to pursue his psychological research without committing himself to a neurological theory which he had attempted to formulate and which he was unable to bring to a level which was commensurate with his psychological studies; he was indebted to Hughlings Jackson and Herbert Spencer for the ontology of his theory. J. B. Watson's methodology-which became an ontology-was based explicitly on a rejection of mental substances as part of the domain of science. And some of his more polemical writings show just how seriously he took this problem above all others. Similar statements could be made about the positions of Wundt, McDougall, Tolman, Lashley, Sherrington, Eccles, and other major psychologists whose work is still influencing experimental research. The history of psychology has had to live in a world whose basic substances are the mental and the physical. When psychology was seen to be a biological science, it therefore had no basis for its fundamental variables. The physical precluded the essential notions of pleasure-pain, adaptation, and utility, while the mental world was (it was finally decided) unmeasurable. Thus historians and philosophers have a common ground with working psychologists in attempting to develop the basis of a biological science of psychology in a world of minds and bodies. It is no accident that the characterisation of mental phenomena has always borrowed its language from the world of matter. As Bain showed, no other language is available to psychology. The history of psychology, therefore, has important relations with the history of science, the history of philosophy, and with current debates in the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of science.
I have argued that the history of the behavioural sciences must pay much closer attention to the Scientific Revolution. Conversely, a great deal of work remains to be done on the history of the problems which have been traditionally associated with psychology as they influenced the main stream of the history of science. For example, the influence of the association psychology on the development of theories of evolution has not, to my knowledge, been explored, except in two brief chapters of a general work. In fact, Hartley's theory provided the essential mechanism for Erasmus Darwin's theory of evolution. Similarly, the mechanism of so-called 'Lamarckian' evolution was associationist, and Herbert Spencer developed it in this form: "The familiar doctrine of association here undergoes a great extension; for it is held that not only in the individual do ideas become connected when in experience the things producing them have repeatedly occurred together, but that such results of repeated occurrences accumulate in successions of individuals: the effects of associations are supposed to be transmitted as modifications in the nervous system". Finally, there is a great deal of fundamental research to be done on the relations between associationism, the 'Philosophical Radicals', and the development of both social legislation and evolutionary thinking in the nineteenth century. Aspects of this have been considered ' but its full import has not been appreciated.
If we look more closely at the history of the association psychology, the works of Ribot'  and Warren  remain the best expositions of this tradition. These books will continue to be useful, but this merit implies an important limitation. Neither makes a serious attempt at analysing or criticising the books which it is considering. Also they are only considering the major works of the major figures, and they ignore the contexts in which men wrote. It would be anachronistic to criticise Ribot and Warren for writing only about the great books of great men since other branches of historical scholarship were still in the process of transcending this essentially un-historical approach. Indeed, Ribot was not writing history; he was translating contemporary British literature for a French audience. Warren, though purporting to write history, was dealing with a living tradition which had not yet been successfully absorbed by behaviourism. The book .was begun in 1903 and completed in 1921, and its final chapters reported contemporary work. It is a tribute to the authors that these treatments continue to be useful, but it is also a comment upon subsequent scholarship that their shortcomings have not been noted, much less corrected, by detailed studies which take account of a wider range of materials in investigating narrower topics.
Even if one accepts the assumptions of the anachronistic historiography which have prevailed in the history of psychology, it is still surprising that associationism has not received a more thorough treatment. The continuity between nineteenth-century associationism and modern psychological research has been amply stressed. In 1930 Brett developed this point with some care and traced the links between associationism, the reflex concept, and the conditioned reflex as they were united by the behaviourists. He saw these developments as "the latest form if associationism". They constituted the contemporary solution to efforts to justify associationism "by reference to physiological processes" and bring it into touch with "bedrock of experience". "Discarding the unnecessary phrase 'of ideas', and broadening both thought and language to suit the new outlook, it is correct to say that the use of conditioned reflexes is the most significant way in which the central positions of associationism are active today". Behaviourism was a fundamental transfiguration of associationism, but its basic assumptions remain clear. Twenty years later, Murphy traced the continuity between nineteenth-century associationism and recent research. "If one had to summarise the main trend as it now exists in the middle of the century, it would almost certainly have to be to the effect that despite huge continuous protests of strong and active personalities, the conceptions of Bain and Spencer a hundred years ago remain dominant. . . . An enormous amount of sophistication has gone into experimental and quantitative refinement of the theory of association; but the framework set up by the associationists remains". One might add that the theory of association is also at the foundation of psychoanalytic theory and therapy.
If we set aside the interests of current psychology, and consider the contemporary context, we find that the significance of the principle of association was appreciated almost at the outset. It was Hume who pointed out that this theory was the fundamental law of the mental world, just as gravity was the fundamental law of the material world. "Here is a kind of Attraction, which in the mental world will be found to have as extraordinary as in the natural, and show itself in as many and as various forms". Why, then, has the work of the founder of the associationism received such scant attention at the hands of historians of psychology? Hartley's theory developed out of suggestions in Locke and in Gay, which he then synthesised with ideas drawn from Newton. From these he developed a systematic physiological psychology based on the two principles of physical vibration in the nervous system, paralleled by mental associations: "The Doctrine of Vibrations may appear at first Sight to have no Connection with that of Association; however, if these Doctrines be found in fact to contain the Laws of the Bodily and Mental Powers respectively, they must be related to each other, since the Body and Mind are. One may expect, that Vibrations should infer Association as their Effect, and Association point to Vibrations as its Cause  The principles for which Hartley argued became accepted as the basic assumptions of physiological psychology in the nineteenth century, and they have thus not changed fundamentally since 1749. The developments which were based on this theory form the most important aspect of the application of the scientific revolution to the neural, behavioural and social sciences. Nevertheless, there has been no full-scale study of Hartley's work and influence. I know of only one paper in the recent literature, and this is of an expository nature. Among older writings the only paper which I have been able to find was a brief discussion of one aspect of his earlier thought. The only monograph which has appeared was primarily expository and popular, and this was published in 1881.
The relationship between Hartley and Joseph Priestley and the development of Hartley's doctrine in Priestley's hands also deserve serious study. These, together with the reaction on the part of the Scottish philosophers of 'common sense', form a significant part of the history of ideas and the relationship between mind and body on the one hand and the problem of epistemology on the other. The most recent monograph on Priestley pays scant attention to these issues, and I have seen no other study which treats it seriously. Such studies should form a small part of a more broadly-based investigation which could concern itself with the pleasure-pain principle, utilitarianism, and their influences on social, political, scientific, and philosophical thinking. Aspects of this problem have been touched upon, for example by Schofield and in the masterly study of Halévy. These should be complemented with other specialised studies which might form the basis of a more synthetic work. One could then go further to consider the continuity between these ideas and those of evolution, pragmatism, functional psychology and modern psychological theories such as behaviourism and psycho-analysis.
The psychological theories of Erasmus Darwin will form an integral part of such an investigation. The only serious appreciation of his work in this area known to me is a chapter in Lewes's History of Philosophy.  The author of the most recent monograph on Erasmus Darwin fails to consider the relationship between his theory and that of Hartley on the one hand and their developments by Priestley on the other. Indeed, he thinks the associationist basis of Erasmus Darwin's classification of disease fallacious and describes it only to dismiss it. An important first step in the study of the work and influence of Hartley and Darwin would be the reprinting of their major works. There are no signs that Zoonomia may appear, and the promised reprinting of Hartley's Observations has not yet occurred.
Utilitarianism and associationism contributed significantly to the background of the modern theory of evolution. The theory of evolution, in turn, raised issues about the concept of mind which are not yet resolved. The most important figures in the nineteenth-century concerned with this debate were Charles Darwin, Herbert Spencer, G. J. Romanes, Hughlings Jackson and, less importantly, T. H. Huxley and A. R. Wallace. The most fundamental, though not always explicit, issue in the evolutionary debate was man's place in nature and the implications of evolution for mind, the concept of responsibility, and theology. But one finds that historians have paid scant attention to this aspect of the evolutionary debate. This failure has occurred as much on the side as historians of biology as that of historians of the behavioural sciences. Thus there is no detailed study of Darwin's psychological work. The most recent study of A. R. Wallace is primarily concerned with his contributions to Zoogeography and makes no attempt to provide an analysis of his writings on mind and evolution.  Eiseley's treatment is more thorough, but it is marred by his advocacy of a separation of man's mind from the laws which control the rest of evolution and behaviour; his attempt to read Darwin in the light of Wallace's views reveals the lengths to which one can go in applying personal beliefs to the facts of history. The writings of Darwin, Spencer, Wallace, Lewes, Romanes, Lloyd Morgan and later figures on mind and evolution await considered historical study and would provide the materials for an important contribution to our understanding of the history of biology and psychology. It is something of a scandal that these have been neglected, while historians of psychology continue to re-tell the same old stories, and so ignore an absolutely fundamental aspect of the heritage of modern thought. Each of these figures is worthy of at least a monograph, but one finds that most of them have not even had so much as an article devoted to their work. Chapters which appear in the standard histories are helpful but lack depth. The theories of Darwin, Spencer, and Wallace on the application of evolution and natural selection to the mind are a self-contained unit which could itself form the basis of a very important study. Historians have contented themselves with dismissing Spencer because of his Lamarckism, praising Darwin for his inspiration, and ignoring Wallace.
If one considers lesser figures and influences in the application of evolution to mind, the curious role of phrenology in contributing to the study of mind and brain and in stressing the significance of the concept of adaptation to psychology is worth more careful study than it has yet received. Phrenology significantly influenced the general movement toward the naturalistic treatment of man in the nineteenth century, including, in particular, the evolutionary theories of Chambers, Spencer, and Wallace, but these influences and the more general effects of phrenology have been largely ignored.81 Similarly the seminal influence of Thomas Laycock (who, incidentally, also benefited from the phrenological movement) has been the subject of only one recent paper, and this was only concerned with one aspect of his work. 82 Thomas Laycock formulated a theory which stressed that the nervous system must be seen as one continuous series of structures obeying one law, that of the reflex. His views came from a pre-evolutionary traditional. This was combined with Spencer's evolutionary associationism to form the two major influences on Jackson's psychophysiological theories. These, in turn, were basic to the work of Ferrier and Sherrington. Laycock's role in such a fundamental aspect of the history of the study of mind and brain should be given more careful attention than it has yet received. One concludes that Jackson was certainly fortunate in his intellectual mentors, since they gave him the best of the old (Laycock) and the new (Spencer) versions of the principle of continuity as applied to the nervous system. This matter must be much more closely examined, but it already appears that this parallel development of identical conceptions based respectively on the old and new philosophy of biology is most remarkable and interesting.
The number of subjects within the history of the behavioural sciences which would repay intensive study seems to be inexhaustible. We have no history of the concept of adaptation from natural theology and theodicy to its modern form in evolution and in functional psychology. We have no history of faculty psychology, nor of the concept of function. Each of these has important historical bearings, and the last is of fundamental philosophical significance. Indeed, as Whitehead suggested, the concept of function may be the Achilles heel of dualistic ontology of modern science. Finally, the concept of behaviour itself has not been given any sort of historical treatment, although the lineage from physiognomy, debates on the role of touch in learning and the muscle sense, form an interrelated set of influences which played an important part in the development of psychological and philosophical thinking.
If we confine our attention to the concept of function within the context of mind and evolution, the next logical step is a detailed examination of the development of functional thinking after 1859. Functional psychology was an outgrowth of the ferment in Cambridge, Massachusetts, in the 1860s and 1870s which led to the philosophical movement of pragmatism. In fact, James proved the most articulate exponent of both views. It can be questioned whether pragmatism as a movement (as opposed to Peirce as an individual philosopher) has made a significant contribution to philosophy. But its heuristic value in generating psychological, social, and educational conceptions is beyond question. The pragmatic approach which influenced James's early thinking had its origins in Darwin, Spencer, J. S. Mill and Bain as interpreted through Peirce, Chauncey Wright, and Nicholas St. John Green at the meetings of the 'Metaphysical Club'.84 James's Principles of psychology was a synthesis of the evolutionary and adaptive points of view with James's education in medicine and physiology. It drew most heavily on Spencer, Bain and Wundt, within the general atmosphere created by Darwin and the discussions surrounding evolution.
John Dewey was inspired by James's work and founded a 'functional' school of thought in psychology, and it may be useful to be reminded of the transitional position of this school-between the new evolutionism and behaviourism. Dewey's article on "The reflex concept in psychology"  is usually considered the starting point of the functional movement. He attempted to free the reflex concept from a simple mechanistic interpretation and to take account of plasticity and the importance of the environment. Sensations and motions were not simple variables but should be considered in their functional context. His talk on "Psychology and social practice" spelt out the technological and practical applications of functionalism, and his educational work is shown to follow naturally from his biological, adaptive point of view. His article on "The influence of Darwin on philosophy"  shows how evolution became the central theme of his life's work: "The influence of Darwin upon philosophy resides in his having conquered the phenomena of life for the principle of transition, and thereby freed the new logic for application to mind and morals and life. When he said of species what Galileo had said of the earth, e pur se muove, he emancipated, once for all, genetic and experimental ideas as an organon for asking questions and looking for explanations".
James R. Angell was the principal expositor of functionalism. His 1906 Presidential Address to the American Psychological Association is the classical statement of the movement. He is quite explicit about its ancestry: "Whatever else it may be, functional psychology is nothing wholly new. In certain of its phases it is plainly discernible in the psychology of Aristotle and in its more modern garb it has been increasingly in evidence since Spencer wrote his Psychology and Darwin his Origin of Species". This article should be read in conjunction with Titchener's "The postulates of a structural psychology", since both structuralism and functionalism owed much of their identities as 'schools' to the debates that occurred between them.
Ruckmich provides a very useful textual analysis of the use of the term 'function' in this period, and Dallenbach gives some evidence to support the thesis that the introduction of the term in a psychological (as opposed to a physiological) sense was due to the influence of phrenology on the nineteenth-century British psychologists from Thomas Brown to Spencer. If this could be demonstrated in detail, it would provide a powerful additional argument in favour of the seminal importance in phrenology in converting psychology into a biological science. Changes in the meaning of the term 'function' are a crucial indication of the development of biological psychology.
Functionalism was characterised by its concern for mind in use, activity as opposed to contents, and behaviour as the natural outcome of perceiving and knowing. It also had a greater interest in physiology and the mind-body relationship than other contemporary schools. It was an evolutionary, biological psychology concerned with adjustment to rather than representation of reality. Functionalism flourished only briefly as a recognisable movement; J. B. Watson claimed that "behaviorism is the only consistent and logical functionalism". This bid for absorption seems to have worked, and Watson rapidly, overlaid this initial formulation with the reflex concept as the standard explanatory model and added on a narrow materialist ontology that largely obscured the biological, adaptive and comparative thinking of the early functionalists. More particularly, his polemic against the introspective method led him to deny any significance to consciousness and mental variables. It has been shown that this philosophic nonsense must be separated from his methodological contributions. The result was that orthodox behaviourists dealt with the most difficult problem of modern thought by abrogating it, where the functionalists had held out some hope of putting mental variables into a biological context.
The functional view is still supported in some quarters, but it is not seriously considered to be among the current 'schools' of thinking in psychology. It would be most interesting to do a full study of the development of this aspect of psychology from Spencer and Darwin until behaviourism stole the limelight after 1913, and then to use an historical approach in an attempt to dig functionalism out from under Watson's behaviourism, the reflex, and materialism (with its allied operationism) and see what it can offer to the presents Once again, functionalism could and should eventually be studied in a broader context, and the main figures for such a study would certainly be Oliver Wendell Holmes Jnr., G. H. Mead, and John Dewey, at least on the questions of law, sociology, and philosophy of a democratic society and its educational system.
There are many other desiderata in the history of the behavioural sciences: The history of French sensationalism from Condillac to the Ideologues has received scant attention in the English literatures.  A full history of the reflex concept has not been seriously attempted since Fearing, although Canguilhem has considered the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century developments with care.  And there is a need for more careful studies of the work of Prochaska, Whytt, Hall, Carpenter and Sherrington. The history of the study of personality has hardly begun, although Roback has provided a bibliography which will prove of some use, and Allport has provided broad outlines. The history of animal psychology is a topic which has interesting relations with other aspects of biology and philosophy, but it has not been considered in any detail. The history of sensory-motor physiology forms a subject in its own right which extends from Greek science to behaviourism. Professor Temkin may provide us with an aspect of this in his promised study of the history of the concept of irritability, which has begun with an article on Glisson.102 It is perhaps invidious to go on listing areas in which research needs doing, but such lists may possibly have the dual effect of attracting outsiders to this field and encouraging those who have already written in it to pursue topics which may be more fruitful than the writing of further textbooks.
One aspect of the history of the behavioural sciences which has, until now, beenl developing independently of both the history of science and the rest of the history of psychology is the history of psychoanalysis. Every student of the works of Freud and psychonanalysis owes an important debt to Ernest Jones's definitive biography. But Jones's self-imposed brief and his closeness to Freud make his work as much a source of data for historical analysis as it is guide to further research. As soon as the standard edition of the complete psychological works of Freud is complete, it will be necessary to deepen and qualify his biographical account by means of more detailed studies based on a wider appeal to the history of science and the history of ideas. Since Jones's work appeared, a number of collections of letters, diaries, and minutes have begun to be published, and these provide indispensable aids to this work. The most important need is to integrate the history of psychoanalysis with the rest of the history of psychology. Jones has done something on this subject concerning Brentano, Fechner, Charcot, Bernheim, Liebault, and the physiological tradition in which Freud was educated. But we still tend to forget that Freud's language was drawn from 'physicalist physiology' in Germany and that his basic philosophical assumption was drawn from the English tradition via Jackson's interpretation of Herbert Spencer's doctrine of concomitance. Thus Freud's theory was dualistic, and the form of dualism to which he adhered was psychophysical parallelism. The long history of the principle of association leads directly to Freud's work, and his use of the reflex paradigm in the locus classicus of his theory of the mind should also be more closely investigated. Finally, the evolutionary point of view and the concept of adaptation were central to Freud's thinking and have become significant in later developments in psychoanalysis. I refer to the movement which was begun by Anna Freud and Hartmann and has been further developed in America by Rapaport and others. In addition to the historical interest of these relationships, it could be shown that many of the limitations of psychoanalytic theory are due to the fact that Freud's biological goals were crippled by his adherence to psychophysical parallelism. Finally, the relationship between Freud and broader issues in the history of civilisation have received a great deal of attention, the most enlightening works on this topic being those of Brown and Reiff.
Some useful articles have appeared on the history of psychoanalysis, but a number of these lack the essential historical objectivity. Few are free from the tradition of worship and incantation, or vituperation, which has retarded scholarship on this subject. One topic which has been treated objectively is Freud's early period. Before the theory of the mind with which he is identified was fully developed, Freud attempted to base his work on brain physiology. We are extremely fortunate in having an early manuscript perserved: "The project for a scientific psychology" (1895). A number of articles have considered aspects of this period, although it requires further study.
The history of ideas about the Unconscious has been explored to some extent, but this topic awaits a scholar with the requisite linguistic and philosophical training. Whyte has hinted at some of the issues, and von Hartmann has displayed the philosophical depth involved.
At a more general level, a series of monographs is in progress which makes useful contributions to historical, theoretical, and philosophical aspects of psychoanalysis. Sixteen numbers of Psychological issues have been published. To historians the most interesting of the series are "The structure of psychoanalytic theory; a systematizing attempt" by David Rapaport, "The influence of Freud on American psychology" by David Shakow and Rapaport. Any attempt to understand the structure of the psychoanalytic theory must begin with the seminal articles of Rapaport, whose tragic death has deprived us of further help from him on this topic. One hopes that his essay on the history of associationism will, in due course, be translated and published.
Psychoanalysis has provided its own bibliographical apparatus: The index of psychoanalytic writings continues to appear, as does The annual survey of psychoanalysis.
Research in the history of psychiatry has been helped by the publication of Hunter and MacAlpine's Three hundred years of psychiatry, 1535-1860. Their presentation of excerpts from several hundred works gives us some idea of the scope of this subject, even though they have limited themselves to works in English or in English translation. This work should help to free us from the systematic Freudian bias which characterises the standard work in the field, Zilboorg's A history of medical psychology, which has the further disadvantage of relying heavily on secondary and tertiary sources. The same limitation applies to the work of Schneck. Indeed the small volume by Ackerknecht provides the only useful, original and objective introduction to this field in English. A short history of psychiatry can help the beginner without instilling second-hand or biased knowledge. The more modest works of Bromberg and Walker do not attempt to provide standards of scholarship which can serve as a basis for further inquiries. Some hope for the development of scholarly standards in the history of psychiatry has been provided by recent articles by Mora on the historiography of psychiatry, which, incidentally, also shows that the new Journal of the history of the behavioral sciences may provide an important vehicle for responsible research in this area.
Since studies in the history of the behavioural sciences have not yet developed a clear appreciation of historical method and historiography, it may be appropriate to discuss some ways which have been suggested for approaching historical objectivity. One of these is exemplified by an article by Krantz, which is an extremely interesting attempt to quantifv Kuhn's hypothesis with respect to publication rates in 'anomalous' (i.e., potentially crisis-making) areas in psychology. The author's claims are very modest, but the attempt is promising. Further uses for quantitative methods in the history of psychology have been developed by Cardno and Watson. In the preliminary studies which he has published, Cardno has attempted to find firm criteria for selection of material, identification of historical changes, and assignment of eminence. These are odd, but curiously interesting, studies. The application of statistics to historical studies in this way seem so far to have produced little enlightenment, if one considers the effort involved. For example, in one article he discusses the possibility that G. H. Lewes's work on personality has been unfairly neglected. Cardno treats this as an hypothesis, chooses William James for comparison, and a definition by Allport for a criterion. He then chooses parallel texts and a number of 'modern' concepts. His detailed classification of instances and his calculations lead him to conclude that "on balance, the view is justified that Lewes is a precursor of the modern psychology of personality, has been undeservedly forgotten". The conclusion is unexceptionable, but one hopes that Cardno will move on to a critical exposition of Lewes, now that his I modernity' has been statistically established. Other papers in this series, using the Rand bibliography, encyclopedia articles, and other quasi-objective measures, may provide much more fruitful information. Cardno is preparing a history of psychology from 1797 and 1874, and one hopes that his objective methods will be balanced by critical exposition.
Although one may derive some benefit from these quantitative methods, there are more direct means available to the historian who wishes to place himself inside the thought of a period. To some extent, of course, the historian of science is inevitably on the outside, and he therefore searches through lives and letters, book reviews, referees' reports, and other contemporary documents to try to grasp the nuances of a period and to immerse himself in the issues as they appeared at the time. This was always good scholarship, and Kuhn has reminded us that it may be essence of the historical method in science. Hence one is grateful on behalf of future historians of the behavioural sciences to learn that efforts are being made to make materials available. Some of these are a burden to experimental scientists, others provide valuable archives for the future. Efforts are also being made to gather these materials systematically. In the area of American psychology, an archive has been established at the University of Akron, and psychologists are being canvassed in the hope that they may either deposit their papers or arrange for those of others to be made available for future scholars. The same foresight was exhibited earlier by Boring when he encouraged his colleagues to write autobiographical sketches for the series The history of psychology and autobiography. These are of immense value, and they can sometimes provide just the right vignette to illustrate a point. For example, the change which British academic psychology underwent in the period after the main publications of Bain and Spencer had appeared is perfectly illustrated by a letter from Spencer to Bain in 1902: "I do not unfrequently think of the disgust you must feel at the fate which has overtaken Mind that you, after establishing the thing and maintaining it for so many years to your own cost, should not find it turned into an organ for German idealism must be extremely exasperating . . . Oxford and Cambridge have been captured by this old-world nonsense. What about Scotland? I suppose Hegelianism is rife there also". Spencer withdrew his subscription a few months later.
Nonetheless, the historian of science has one immense advantage over his colleagues in social and political history. On the whole, the nature of science requires that influences be stated explicitly: science is a public activity. This is, of course, less true for earlier periods, but as one enters the seventeenth century and progresses to the eighteenth and then to the periodical tradition of the nineteenth century, one can discern many influences by inspection. In the twentieth century this has become a reductio ad absurdum with impossibly long bibliographies which fail in the responsibility to let nonsense die, but one would still rather sift from too many references than be deprived of essential ones. The availability of relatively complete information about influences leads to many hours of perusal of material that turns out to be useless, but this again is preferable to the kind of speculative, more or less plausible, suggested influences which form the basis of a great deal of bad literary history. Similarly, the history of science reveals an explicit continuity, between ideas. Thus, the division between a review article and history must be arbitrary in one sense, while it is crucial in another. Indeed, review articles are doubly useful. The professional scientist is in a position to make contributions which the professional historian could perhaps make but only with great difficulty. First, the man working day by day in the field, attending congresses and keeping up with the experimental literature has a sense of relevance which can only come from working with the issues on the operational level. He knows what is going on. Thus the best part of Boring's books are concerned with the period in which he lived. One of the chief tasks of the historian is to convert these raw materials provided in review articles (and even review articles which call themselves history) into something which the historian of science can recognise as history. These provide an invaluable guide to the actual history of science as opposed to reconstructed or logical links which are much tidier than the actual story. This approach also helps to avoid reducing history to the study of whether or not A is buried in B's grave. An excellent example of this kind of review is Teuber's article on perception . In the history of neurophysiology, the nineteenth-century provides a number of helpful works.  Postman's Psychology in the making purported to be history but was in fact a series of review articles: it will also be useful in this way.  The series on Psychology: a study of a science attempts to review the whole domain of current psychology and its relations with other sciences and will be an important source for future work. Similarly, as Kuhn has stressed, textbooks provide essential keys to the norms or paradigms of science in a period. The works of Woodworth, Hilgard and Marquis, Stevens, and Osgood, fall under this rubric. The Annual review of psychology provides periodic, exhaustive treatment of the topics under consideration. Indeed, the topics chosen give a very clear picture of fashions in investigation in the behavioural sciences. Similarly, 'stock-taking' articles such as some of those contained in the Koch series, the classical paper on operationism by Stevens, and some of the pieces in Perspectives in biology and medicine, are also useful in this context.
Some of these review articles show that it is impossible to separate the history of the behavioural sciences from philosophy. Indeed, the contents of collections of readings in the philosophy of science and those in psychological theory overlap a great deal. Some of the pieces which are not included in these collections are of considerable interest, e. Pribram's "Review of theory in physiological psychology" and Bergmann's "Theoretical psychology", both of which appeared in the Annual review of psychology,. Similarly, philosophical issues have been illuminated by reference to the history of empirical psychology. Bergmanns case study in a philosophical problem-"The problem of relations in classical psychology"-makes this point by example.
The continuity between the history, of psychology and the history of philosophy is considered in the standard sources, although (with the possible exception of Brett) the result leaves a great deal to be desired. Discussion of the relationship between psychology and the general history of science has received only very superficial treatment at the hands of both historians of psychology and other historians of science. There is an explanation, if not a justification, for the way in which authors of the standard histories of psychology have avoided this issue or dealt with it briefly. Psychology can be said to be in a 'pre-paradigm' state. That is, it has not reached a level of development whereby most workers in the field agree on its basic assumptions, method, and units of analysis. Similarly, prior to Newton there was no period which exhibited a single generally accepted view about the nature of light. "Instead there were a number of competing schools and sub-schools, most of them espousing one variant or another of Epicurean, Aristotelian, or Platonic theory". Psychology is still in this position: in 1931, R. S. Woodworth wrote an extremely useful review of the state of psychology which was appropriately entitled, Contemporary schools of psychology. It is significant of developments since then that a third edition of the same work appeared in 1964. The book was extensively revised, Woodworth having died after completing the manuscript with a collaborator, but no one felt that there was any need to alter the title or even the main divisions of the book. This insecurity is complemented by the fact that only relatively recently has psychology freed itself from speculation and established the need for experimental methods. There is an important disjunction between periods and attitudes. But when associationism introduced introspective and then behavioural experiments, it did not thereby cease to make philosophical assumptions: it only became able to test theories based on these assumptions more adequately. In general, science does not stop making philosophical assumptions when it becomes experimental. This remark would be jejune if its contrary were not an apparent assumption in many works in the history of psychology. Those who assume that experimental scientists do not make assumptions are doomed to write appalling history, because they fail to take so much of it seriously. This is not the place to discuss a similar naiveté involved in approaching experiments in this way: 'the confrontation of an unencumbered rational n-find with nature'. The only way to avoid involvement with philosophical assumptions is to say nothing. If anyone supposes himself free from philosophy, the result will be that his philosophical assumptions are held completely uncritically. This has been understood for some time in other branches of science and its history; there is some evidence that it is being appreciated by experimentalist psychologists, but the positivistic attitude of Skinner is perhaps more characteristic., The elevation of a method into a metaphysic is perhaps the greatest danger of this point of view, as Bergmann has admirably shown in the case of Watson. Amateur historians, however, apparently have not heard the news. The reluctance with which American psychology departments accepted historical theses is but one example of this fear of non-experimental studies, based, though it is, on a category mistake. Much of this prejudice can be traced to the alliance between operationism, behaviourism, and logical positivism. This development is now becoming history, while its effects are still very apparent. A most interesting parallel study could be made of operationism in physics and psychology, including its continued success in the latter in contrast to its decline in the former.
If we move away from this particular issue to the more general topics of mutual interest between philosophy and psychology, the whole area of psycho-physics and the study of the specific energies of nerves should be considered in conjunction with the doctrine of primary and secondary qualities. Similarly, the limitations of psycho-physics in achieving a relationship between physically measurable quantities and subjectively experienced qualities have played a significant part in influencing ideas in subjects as far afield as anthropology.
It is altogether appropriate that philosophers of mind should be directly concerned with the writings of experimental psychologists, both in their empirical and in their theoretical works. As Taylor has recently reminded us, "the neo-behaviorist or stimulus-response (SR) theories ... are, in many ways the descendants of classical empiricism". Thus, the history of the behavioural sciences properly works hand in hand with philosophy. This is not merely an underlabourer view of history serving philosophy which is, in turn, the underlabourer of science. Rather, it is based on the assumption that the philosophy of science must show its relevance to actual problems in science. History spells out the assumptions by providing the perspective which is often unattainable within the science itself. Works like those of Strawson and Taylor present important philosophical theses which bear upon the reading of the history of psychology. The books themselves are a-historical to a large extent. To weigh accurately the merits and applicability of the fundamentally important approach of descriptive metaphysics, one must do the historical work required. Therefore, the historian must say to the philosopher of mind that he must become a better historian, just as the historian of the behavioural sciences must become a better philosopher. Thus, important works on the philosophy of mind must be brought to bear on historical issues but must also improve their own history. 
Given the standards of scholarship which exist in the history of the behavioural sciences, it is fortunate that the subject has such useful links with other fields. Related works can serve as examples to those who are at present at work in the history of the behavioural sciences. For example, Aram Vartanian, a professor of modern language has provided us with a very sensitive monograph on La Mettrie and an interpretation of the Cartesian heritage which challenges the traditional view. Owsei Temkin, a professor of the history of medicine, as already mentioned, has enriched our understanding of phrenology, the physiology of Magendie, and the concept of irritability. Finally, Sir Geoffrey Jefferson, a neuro-surgeon now deceased, has shown just how well an amateur can write the history of neurology in his essays on Descartes, Spencer, and cerebral localization. Work of an extremely high standard is to be expected from professional historians of science, but one is, nevertheless, grateful when articles appear such as those of A. C. Crombie on the development of perceptual studies. It is also interesting to note that a recent writer in the history of philosophy has taken an account of both the philosophical and psychological works which were significant in his own subject. Similarly, helpful background to writing in the history of the behavioural sciences could be provided if its students would avail themselves of works written from different perspectives.
This review began by noting that the history of the behavioural sciences has received some sort of status, while most of its text has been concerned with reservations which must be expressed about recent work and indications of further research which is needed. The single most important development in the field which gives hope for the future is the appearance of the Journal of the history of the behavioral sciences. I confess that I read the first article in the new journal with dismay. It is, of course, altogether fitting that Professor Boring contributed the piece, and it is a compliment to the new journal that he was prepared to do so. But its subject-the date of the founding of Wundt's laboratory-was an unfortunate choice, given the tendency to perseveration which has been discussed above. It is also unfortunately symptomatic of three limitations from which the history of psychology has suffered: great men (whom to worship?), great insights, and great dates. There is not space to review the contents of the journal in detail, although a reading of the first volume leads one to have mixed feelings. The lack of high standards of scholarship which has been discussed above is still in evidence, but this is inevitable. The range of interest in the new journal is one of its most heartening features. The book reviews are disappointing, and one might suggest that the subject would benefit immensely from critical essay reviews rather than the extremely polite, though perfunctory, pieces which have appeared so far. I would like to restrict my detailed remarks on this journal to praise of one article: "From physics to ethnology: Franz Boas' arctic expedition as a problem in the historiography of the behavioral sciences". I should say right away that this is the sort of research which the history of the behavioral sciences sorely needs. It is a highly original, excellent, and detailed treatment of Boas's development from physics to psycho-physics to geography and finally to his work in anthropology. We are shown in detail how his studies in physics led him to consider the philosophical basis of perception and finally to concern himself with the problem of adaptation. This is unequivocal demonstration of the continuity of the problems of knowledge and adaptation from physics to the social sciences-a justification by example for this journal and a demonstration of the links between the behavioural sciences, the philosophy of science, and general biology. The problems of knowing and living are thus continuous, as Spencer saw and Darwin implied. From situational factors involved in the perception of an experimental physicist to situational factors in perception of environment of the Eskimos of Baffinland-this article, though written in a narrower context, rivals Temkin's classical study of the philosophical background of Magendie's physiology as an exercise in illuminating the philosophical assumptions of scientists. One. could offer this piece of research by a working anthropologist as a model for future studies in the history of the behavioural sciences.
In closing I would mention two institutional activities which bear on the study of the history of the behavioural sciences. First, the American Psychological Association has given formal recognition to these activities by setting up a Division of the History of Psychology. The group which achieved this is to a great extent the same one which established the Journal of the history of the behavioral sciences, and it is hoped that these two developments will help to improve the standards of scholarship in this field. Secondly, the American National Institutes of Health have established a History of the Life Sciences Study Section, which makes grants for research in the study of the biological and related (including psychological) sciences. There are also funds for establishing departments or institutes of the history of medicine and science and fellowships for potential teachers. An analysis of the grants given by this organisation between 1959 and 1963 shows that they approved half of the projects and gave two-thirds of the fellowships for which applications were completed .
1. Postman, 1962; Watson, 1963; Hearnshaw, 1964; Miller, 1964. Two collections of notes have also appeared: Roback, 1961; Esper, 1964. The standard work by Flugel has also appeared in an edition revised by West, 1964.
2. Boring, 1961; Boring, 1963; Herrnstein and Boring, 1965.
3. Agassi, 1963.
4. Boring, 1963, p. 80.
5. See also Watson, 1953, 1959, 1960[a], 1961. Professor Watson and Dr Eric T. Carlson were the prime movers in founding the new Journal of the history of the behavioral sciences, which Watson now edits. He has also been active in the founding of a Division of the History of Psychology in the American psychological Association.
6. Head, 1926; Boring, 1950; Riese and Hoff, 1950-1; Stokey, 1954; Walker, 1957; Brazier, 1959; Tizard, 1959; Sheer, 1961. I would except from this rather perseverative study of cerebral localization the original articles of Jefferson, 1960; Meyer, 1960; Zangwill, 1961; Clarke, 1963; Brazier, 1961; Benton and Joynt, 1960. One should also mention the rather imaginative historical reconstruction of Ferrier's discoveries by Thorwald, 1960 (Chapter 1). The bibliographies of Brazier, 1959 and Sheer, 1961 are a rich mine of sources for original research.
7. I make no comments on H. G. Gouch's treatment of clinical versus statistical prediction or J. P. McKee and M. J. Honsik on the sucking behavior of animals as an illustration of the nature-nurture question. In his discussion of the mechanism of hunger and thirst, M. R. Rosenzweig provides a detailed and extremely thorough review of the literature up to the present.
8. Cf. Wilkie, 1959 and Gllispie, 1956, 1959.
9. Spencer, 1887. The Preface to the separately printed version of "The factors of organic evolution" contains material of importance to the history of psychology, which does not appear in the version which was reprinted in Spencer's Essays. Cf. Romanes, 1895.
10. Postman, 1947.
11. Waters, 1934.
12. Cason, 1932.
13. Journal of verbal learning and verbal behavior. Cf. Krasner, 1958; Salzinger, 1959.
14. Gomulicki, 1953.
15. Rapaport. 1942, p. 265.
16. Especially for historical material on Binet and Féré, 1887.
17. Boring, 1963, p. 109.
18. I am treating Boring (1961) and Boring (1963) as a unit. The tables of contents of these works should be consulted to determine which items are contained in which book.
19. If any of his works is to be excepted from this judgement it would be Boring (1942).
20. Boring, 1963[a].
21. This is an expanded version of the account published in the 4th volume of the series A history of psychology in autobiography, Boring, 1952, pp. 27--52. Cf. Murchison, 1930,1932,1936.
22. Mercier, 1925, pp. 42-3.
23. James, 1924, pp. 107-8, 111-112.
24. Boring, 1961, pp. 95-98.
25. Boring, 1961, pp. 110-111, 130. Cf. his obituary of Titchener in Ibid., pp. 246-265 and the dedication of Boring, 1950.
26. Boring, 1950, pp. 329-338, 384-385; 1961, pp. 213 and 215.
27. Boring, 1963, pp. 159-184.
28. Quoted in Wiener, 1949, p. 19.
29. Bain, 1855, pp. v-vi.
30. Bain, 1868, p. 59.
31. Ibid., pp. 64-73.
32. Ibid., pp. 296-306.
33. Ibid., p. 296. Cf. Bain, 1855, p. 289.
34. Boring, 1950, p. 236.
35. Müller, 1838, 1842.
36. Boring, 1961, p. 15.
37. Boring, 1950, p. vii.
38. This point has been most clearly appreciated by G. H. Lewes. See Lewes, 1857, pp. 629-645. It was made with more reservations in the later editions: cf. Lewes, 1871, pp. 412-454.
39. Spoerl, 1935-6.
40. Ibid., p. 224.
41. Ibid., p. 225.
42. Boring, 1950, p. 53. Incidentally, Gall's theory had 27 faculties, not 37. One of the arguments used against phrenology was the way its list of 'fundamental' faculties kept growing.
43. Ibid., p. 59.
44. Boring, 1942, p. 94; 1963, pp. 171 and 182.
45. Watson, 1963, p. 226; Postman, 1962, p. 34.
47. Boring, 1963, p. 329; Temkin, 1946, 1946[a], 1947; Olmsted, 1944; cf. Olmsted, 1953.
48. Passmore, 1957. A comparison of this work with the one by Flugel in the same series makes my point nicely, and the two revisions Flugel's work has undergone drive it home.
49. Kuhn, 1964, p. 2.
50. For example, Brazier, 1959[a]; Magoun, 1958; Sheer, 1961.
51. Kuhn, 1964, p. 3. Cf. Buchdahl, 1965.
52. Herrnstein, R. J. in Contemparary psychology, ix (1964) 195.
53. See also Butterfield, 1931.
54. Stocking, 1965[a].
55. Burtt, 1932, pp. 318-319.
56. Balz, 1951, p. 196. See also Whitehead, 1926 and Dijksterhuis, 1961 on the problems of primary and secondary qualities and final causes.
57. Crombie, 1964, Vartanian, 1953, 1960; Halévy, 1952; Albee, 1962.
58. Quoted in Murphy, 1949, p. 269.
59. Freud (1891) 1953. Cf. the Introduction by Stengel and Stengel, 1954; Riese, 1956, 1958; Jones, l953.
60. Watson, 1913, 1925. Cf. Bergmann, 1956. See also R. I. Watson, 1963, p. 376: "Anything smacking of the mental was anathema to Watson. It was as if to him the mental was outside this rational world of ours, running in the dark with the other ghosts and goblins."
61. Bain, 1903, pp. 162-188. Strawson has demonstrated the philosophic significance of this point: material objects are the basic particulars of both ordinary language and of science. See Strawson, 1959.
62. Mason, 1962, Chs. 27 and 28.
63. Spencer, 1904, Vol. 1, p. 470.
64. Halévy, 1952.
65. Ribot, 1873.
66. Warren, 1921.
67. Brett, 1930, p. 45.
68. Murphy, 1949, p. 283.
69. Hume, 1738, Bk. I, sect. 4 (Everyman Edition, 1911, p. 21).
70. Hartley, 1749, Vol. 1, p. 6.
71. Oldfield and Oldfield, 1951.
72. Rand, 1923.
73. Bower, 1881.
74. Gibbs, 1965. Priestley's works on the mind and the controversies surrounding his psychological and philosophical writings deserve study. His Theological and miscellaneous works were published (1817-32).
75. Schofield, 1963.
76. Halévy, 1952.
77. Lewes, 1857, and later editions. Lewes added chapters on Hartley, Erasmus Darwin, Cabanis, and Gall to the second edition (1857) of this work. His reasons for adding these figures-if they could be discovered should shed light on the development of psychology as a biological science in the 1850s.
78. King-Hele, 1963, pp. 52 and 48.
79. George, 1964, pp. 272-273, 235, 243-246.
80. Eiseley, 1959[a], Ch. xi. Cf. Eiseley, 1959.
81. Some of the evidence which supports this claim may be found in Chambers, 1884, pp. xxx, 365-368, 373, 379-383; Combe, 1827; Gibbon, 1878, Vol. II, pp. 187-189; [Chevenix], 1828; Lewes, 1857, pp. 629-645; Lewes, 1871, Vol. II, pp. 412-454; Temkin, 1947, pp. 307-313; Davies, 1955; Wallace, 1905, Vol. I, pp. 234-236, 257-262; Wallace, 1898, Ch. xvi; Romanes, 1895, pp. 20-22; Spencer, 1904, Vol. 1, pp. 200-203, 225-228, 246-247, 297, 378-379, 540-543; Spencer, 1908, p. 40; Spencer, 1851, pp. 75-89; Spencer, 1855, pp. 606-611; Jefferson, 1960, pp. 35-44; Denton, 1921. A similar claim could be made for French naturalism and positivism: see Greene, 1959 and Temkin, 1947.
82. Amacher, 1964. On phrenology, see Laycock, 1859
83. Laycock, 1840, 1845, 1855, 1860. Cf. Crichton-Browne, 1938, pp. 40-41.
84. Wiener (1949) discusses this period very competently. There is additional material in Perry (1935).
85. Dewey, 1896.
86. Dewey, 1900.
87. Dewey, 1910, pp. 1-20.
88. Dewey, 1910, pp. 8-9. Re James and Dewey, see Dykhuizen, 1962; White, 1943; Hofstadter, 1955, esp. Ch. vii; Perry, 1935, esp. Ch. lxxxi. See also Madden, 1963; Schilpp, 1939; Mead, 1936, Dewey, 1931, 1930, 1963; Thomas, 1962; Harrison, 1963.
89. Angell, 1907, pp. 439-440.
90. Titchener, 1898.
91. Ruckmich, 1913; Dallenbach, 1915.
92. Watson, 1913, p. 463.
93. Watson, 1916.
94. Bergmann, 1956.
95. The primary literature of functionalism is readily available in the textbooks and journals of the period, while many of the papers await investigation. Important secondary sources for functional psychology include Heidbreder, 1933, Chs. 4-6; Carr, 1930, Pillsbury, 1929; Murphy, 1949; Boring, 1950; Hilgard and Marquis, 1940; Hilgard, 1948, 1960; Marx and Hillix, 1963; Woodworth, 1951. The Presidential Addresses to the American Psychological Association, which appeared in the Psychological review, would themselves form the basis for an interesting study.
96. See, however, Picavet, 1891; Rosen, 1946; Temkin, 1946 and the suggestions contained in the writings of Vartanian, 1953, 1960.
97. Fearing, 1930; Canguilhem, 1955. Cf. Liddell, 1960.
98. I have not seen the unpublished doctoral dissertation (Oxford) by R. K. French: Robert Whytt (1714-66) and the problem of the seat of the soul (1965 or 1966).
99. Roback, 1927.
100. Allport, 1937.
101. A beginning can be made from the works of Guer, 1749; Warden, 1927; Cohen, 1936; Rosenfield, 1941; Hastings, 1936; Jennings, 1906; Washburn, 1908; Carr, 1927; Romanes, 1882, 1883.
102. Temkin, 1964.
103. See Riese, 1958; Stengel, 1954, 1963.
104. Freud, 1954, Ch. 7.
105. Anna Freud, 1937; Hartmann, 1958, 1964; Erikson, 1959; Rapaport (in Erikson, 1959); Rapaport and Gill, 1959.
106. Brown, 1959; Reff, 1959.
107. Freud, 1954; Bernfield, 1950; Kris, 1950; Riese, 1958; Stengel, 1954; Pribram, 1962; Anderson, 1962; Greenfield and Lewis, 1965; Amacher, 1965.
108. Whyte, 1960; Von Hartmann, 1931. Cf. Margetts, 1953; Riese, 1958[a]; Sours, 1961.
109. Rapaport, 1960; Shakow and Rapaport, 1964. Other works in the same series are Erikson, 1959; Gill, 1963; Amacher, 1965.
110. See Bibliography (below).
111. Rapaport, 1938.
112. Frosch and Ross, 1964; Grinstein (in progress).
113. Hunter and MacAlpine, 1963.
114. Zilboorg and Henry, 1941.
115. Schenck, 1960.
116. Ackerknecht, 1959.
117. Walker, 1957, Bromberg, 1959.
118. Mora, 1965, 1965[a].
119. Krantz, 1965.
120. Cardno, 1962[a].
121. Many recent symposia consist of papers followed by discussion, for example, Jeffress, 1951; Kruse, 1957; Brazier, 1959[a], 1959[b], 1960; Delafresnaye, 1961. The popularity of symposia in the behavioural sciences has produced something of an 'information explosion'.
122. Murchison, 1930, 1932, 1936; Boring, 1952.
123. Spencer, 1908, pp. 457-458.
124. Teuber, 1959.
125. Tenon et al., 1809; Anon., 1824; Carpenter, 1846; Hunt, 1868-69; Dodds, 1878; Bastian, 1887; Mills, 1890; Soury, 1899.
126. Postman, 1962.
127. Koch, 1959-63.
128. Woodworth, 1931, 1964; Hilgard, 1948; Hilgard and Marquis, 1940; Stevens, 1951,. Osgood, 1953.
129. Koch, 1959-63; Stevens, 1939.
130. Pribram, 1960; Bergmann, 1953. Cf. Kretch and Klein, 1952.
131. Bergmann, 1952.
132. Kuhn, 1964, p. 12.
133. Burtt, 1932, pp. 225 sqq; Whitehead, 1925, pp. 80-82; Lovejoy, 1960, p. 43; Hesse, 1961, pp. v, 98, 125, passim.
134. Livingstone, 1962, p. 60.
135. Skinner, 1959.
136. Bergmann, 1956.
137. Bridgman, 1927, 1959; Boring, 1933; Stevens, 1939, Pratt, 1939; Brunswick, 1952; Marx, 1951; Marx and Hillix, 1963.
138. See Stocking, 1965, p. 57.
139. Taylor, 1964, p. III.
140. Strawson, 1958; Taylor, 1964.
141. Smythics, 1965; Ramsey. 1965.
142. Vartanian, 1953, 1960.
143. Jefferson, 1960. See also Keele, 1957.
144. Crombie, 1964, 1964[a], 1964[b].
145. Randall, 1962.
146. For example, see Macintosh, 1860; Stewart, 1860; Lange, 1875; Stephen, 1902; Merz, 1904-12, Boas, 1925; Willey, 1934, 1940; Cassirer, 1951.
147. Stocking, 1965.
148. Bulletin of the history of medicine, xxxvii (1963) 472-474.
Note:This review makes no claim to comprehensiveness. A full list of primary and secondary sources in the history of psychology and in some other aspects of the history of the behavioural sciences can be gathered from the following sources:
Baldwin, Dictionary of philosophy and psychology, Vol. III (a bibliography prepared by Benjamin Rand, which appeared in 1902).
Psychological index (to 1935).
Psychological abstracts (1927-).
Isis annual bibliographies (very incomplete in this area).
Recent work in the history of medicine.
History of the behavioral sciences newsletter.
The following bibliography includes a number of items of interest which are not mentioned in the text. These include standard references.
Erwin H. Ackerknecht and Henri Vallois, Franz Joseph Gall, inventor of phrenology and his collection, trans. C. St. Léon (Madison: Department of history of medicine, 1956).
Erwin H. Ackerknecht, A short history of psychiatry (N.Y.: Hafner, 1959).
Joseph Agassi, Towards an historiography of science, in History and theory: studies in the philosophy of history, 2 (The Hague: Mouton, 1963).
Ernest Albee, A history of English utilitarianism (1901, reprinted N.Y.: Collier, 1962).
Gordon W. Allport, Personality: a psychological interpretation (N.Y: Holt, 1937).
M. Peter Amacher, "Thomas Laycock, I. M. Sechenov, and the reflex are concept", Bulletin of the history of medicine, xxxviii (1964) 168-183.
M. Peter Amacher, Freud's neurological education and its influence on psychoanalytic theory (N.Y: International Universities, 1965).
O. Anderson, Studies in prehistory of psychoanalysis: the etiology of psychoneuroses and some related themes in Sigmund Freud's scientific writings and letters, 1886-1896 (Stockholm, Svenska Bokförlaget, 1962).
James R. Angell, "The province of functional psychology", Psychological review, xiv (1907) 61-91 (reprinted in Dennis, 1948, pp. 439-456).
James R. Angell, "The influence of Danvin on psychology", Psychological review, xvi (1909) 152-169.
Anon. "Recent discoveries on the physiology of the nervous system", Edinburgh medical and surgical journal, xxi (1824) 141-159.
Alexander Bain, The senses.and the intellect (London: John W. Parker, 1855; 3rd ed., 1868).
Alexander Bain, The emotions and the will (London: John W. Parker, 1859; 3rd ed., 1875).
Alexander Bain, Dissertations on leading philosophical topics (London: Longmans, 1903).
James M. Baldwin (ed.), Dictionary of philosophy and psychology, 3 vols. in 4 (N.Y: Macmillan, 1901; 2nd ed., 1925. Reprinted Gloucester, Mass: Smith, 1940, 1957, 1960).
James M. Baldwin, History of psychology: a sketch and an interpretation, 2 vols. (London: Watts, 1913).
Albert G. A. Balz, Cartesian studies (N.Y: Columbia, 1951).
Gerhardt von Bonin (trans.), Some papers on the cerebral cortex (Springfield, Ill: Thomas, 1960).
Ernst Cassirer, The philosophy of the enlightenment, trans. F. C. A. Koelln and J. T. Pettegrove (Princeton, 1951 . Reprinted Boston: Beacon, 1955).
H. Charlton Bastian, The brain as an organ of mind (London: Kegan Paul, 1880).
H. Charlton Bastian, "The 'muscular sense'; its nature and cortical localization", Brain, x (1887), 1-89.
Arthur Benton and Robert J. Joynt, "Early descriptions of aphasia", Archives of Neurology, iii (1960) 205-222.
Gustav Bergmann, "The problem of relations in classical psychology", Philosophical quarterly, ii (1952) 140-152.
Gustav Bergmann, "Theoretical Psychology", Annual review of psychology, iv (1953) 435-458.
Gustav Bergmann, "The contribution of John B. Watson", Psychological review, lxiii (1956) 265-276.
Siegfried Bernfield, "Freud's scientific beginnings", American imago, vi (1949) 3-36.
Alfred Binet and Charles Féré, Animal magnetism (London: Kegan Paul, 1887).
George Boas, French philosophers of the romantic period (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1925).
Edwin G. Boring, Sensation and perception in the history of experimental psychology (N.Y: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1942).
Edwin G. Boring, A history of experimental psychology, 2nd ed. (N.Y: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1950).
Edwin G. Boring (ed.), A history of psychology in autobiography, Vol. IV (Worcester, Mass,:Clark, 1952).
Edwin G. Boring, Psychologist at large: an autobiography and selected essays (N.Y: Basic, 1961).
Edwin G. Boring, History, psychology, and science: selected papers. Edited by Robert I. Watson and Donald T. Campbell (N.Y. and London: Wiley, 1963). PP. xii + 372. 68s.
Edwin G. Boring, The physical dimensions of consciousness (N.Y: Century, 1933. Reprinted N.Y: Dover, 1963[a]).
George S. Bower, Hartley and James Mill (London: Low, Marston, Searle, and Rivington, 1881).
Mary A. B. Brazier, "Rise of neurophysiology in the nineteenth century", Journal of neurophysiology, xx (1957) 212-226.
Mary A. B. Brazier, "The historical development of neurophysiology", in J. Field (ed.) Handbook of physiology - neurophysiology, Vol. I (Washington: American physiological society, 1959) 1-58.
Mary A. B. Brazier (ed.), The central nervous system and behavior, 3 vols. (N.Y: Macy, 1959[a], 1959[b], 1960).
Mary A. B. Brazier, A history of the electrical activity of the brain: the first half-century (London: Pitman, 1961).
George S. Brett, Brett's history of psychology (3 vols., 1912-21) Ed. and Abridged by R. S. Peters (London: Allen and Unwin, 1953).
George S. Brett, "Historical development of the theory of emotions", in M. L. Reymert (ed.) Feelings and emotions (Worcester, Mass: Clark, 1928) 388-397.
George S. Brett, "Associationism and 'act' psychology: a historical retrospect", in Carl M. Murchison (ed.), Psychologies of 1930 (Worcester, Mass: Clark, 1930) 39-58.
P.W. Bridgman, The logic of modern physics (N.Y: Macmillan, 1927).
P.W. Bridgman,The way things are (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard, 1959).
Donald E. Broadbent, Behaviour (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1961).
Walter Bromberg, The mind of man, a history of psychotherapy and psychoanalysis (N.Y: Harper, 1959).
Chandler McC. Brooks and P. F. Cranefield (eds.), The historical development of physiological thought (N.Y: Hafner, 1959).
Norman O. Brown, Life against death: the psychoanaiytic meaning of history (Middletown, Conn: Weslevan, 1959. Reprinted N.Y: Random House, 1959).
Joseph Brozek "Current status of psychology in the U.S.S.R.", Annual review of psychology, xiii (1962) 515-566.
Joseph Brozek, "Recent developments in Soviet psychology", Annual review of psychology, xv (1964) 493-594. (Cf. earlier volumes for review on the same subject by other authors.)
Egon Brunswick, The conceptual framework of psychology (Chicago, 1952).
Gerd Buchdahl, "A revolution in historiography of science", History of science, iv (1965) 55-69.
John W. Burrow, "Evolution and anthropology in the 1860's: the anthropological society of London, 1863-71", Victorian studies, vii (1963) 137-154.
Cyril Burt, "Gustav Theodor Fechner: Elements der Psychopkysik, 1860-1960", British journal of statistical psychology, xiii (1960) 1-10.
Cyril Burt, "Galton's contribution to psychology", Bulletin of the British psychological society, xlv (ig6i) 10-2I.
Cyril Burt, "Francis Galton and his contributions to psychology", British journal of statistical psychology, xv (1962) 1-41.
Edwin A. Burtt, The metaphysical foundations of modern physical science, 2nd ed. (London: Routledge, 1932).
Herbert Butterfield, The whig interpretation of history (London: Bell, 1931).
Georges Canguilhem, La formation du concept de réflexe aux XVIIe et XVIIIe siècles (Paris: Presses Universitaires, 1955).
Leonard Carmichael, "Sir Charles Bell: a contribution to the history of physiological psychology", Psychological review, xxxiii (1927) 188-217.
J.A. Cardno, "Bain and physiological psychology", Australian journal of psychology, vii (1955) 108-119.
J.A. Cardno, "Bain as a social psychologist", Australian journal of Psychology, viii (1956) 66-76.
J. A. Cardno, "Judgement in the history of psychology: literature, science, or understanding", Australian journal of psychology, xiii (1961) 175-183.
J.A. Cardno, "Natural limits and change of content in the history of psychology", Psychological record, xii (1962) 289-298.
J.A. Cardno, "Personality and self, Lewes and James", Psychological record, xii (1962[a]) 45-52.
J. A. Cardno, "The network of reference: comparison in the history of psychology", Journal of general psychology, lxviii (1963) 141-156.
William B. Carpenter, "Noble on the brain and its physiology", British and foreign medical review, xxii (1846) 488-544.
Harvey Carr, "The interpretation of animal mind", Psychological review, xxxiv (1927) 87-106.
Harvey Carr, "Functionalism", in Carl Murchison (ed.), Psychologies of 1930 (Worcester: Clark Univ. Press, 1930) 59-80.
Hulsey Cason, "The pleasure-pain theory of learning", Psychological review, xxxix (1932) 440-466.
Robert Chambers, Vestiges of the natural history of creation, 12th ed. (Edinburgh: Chambers, 1884).
[Richard Chevenix], "Gall and Spurzheim-phrenology", Foreign quarterly review, ii (1828) 1-59.
Edwin Clarke, "The early history of the cerebral ventricles", Transactions and studies of the college of physicians of Philadelphia, 4th series, xxx (1962) 85-89.
Edwin Clarke, "Aristotelian concepts of the form and function of the brain", Bulletin of the history of medicine, xxxvii (1963) 1-14.
Edwin Clarke and Jerry Stannard, "Aristotle on the anatomy of the brain", Journal of the history of medicine and allied sciences, xviii (1963) 130-148.
L.D. Cohen, "Descartes and More on the beast-machine", Annals of science, i (1936) 48-61.
George Combe, Essay on the constitution of man, and its relation to external objects (Edinburgh: Neill, 1827).
James Crichton-Browne, The doctor remembers (London: Duckworth, 1938).
A. C. Crombie, "Early concepts of the senses and the mind", Scientific American, ccx (1964) 108-116.
A. C. Crombie, "Kepler: de modo visionis", in I. B. Cohen and R. Taton (eds.), Mélanges Alexandre Koyré, Vol. II (Paris: Hermann, 1964[a]) 135-172.
A. C. Crombie, "The study of the senses in Renaissance science", in Ithaca: proceedings of the tenth international congress of history of science, 1962, Vol. I (Paris: Hermann, 1964[b]) 93-114.
K.M. Dallenbach, "The history and derivation of the word 'function' as a systematic term in psychology", American journal of psychology, xxvi (1915) 473-484.
Erasmus Darwin, Zoonomia: or, the laws of organic life, 2 vols. (London: Johnson, 1794-6).
John D. Davies, Phrenology, fad and science, a 19th century American crusade (New Haven: Yale, 1955).
J.F. Delafresnaye (ed.), Brain mechanism and learning, a symposium (Oxford: Blackwell, 1961).
Wayne Dennis, Readings in the history of psychology (N.Y: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1948).
George B. Denton, "Early psychological theories of Herbert Spencer", American journal of psychology, xxxii (1921) 5-15.
Max Dessoir, Outlines of the history of psychology, trans. Donald Fisher (N.Y: Macmillan, 1912).
John Dewey, "The reflex are concept in psychology", Psychological review, iii (1896) 357-370.
John Dewey, "Psychology and social practice", Psychological review, vii (1900) 105-124.
John Dewey, The influence of Darwin on philosophy (N.Y: Holt, 1910).
John Dewey' "From absolutism to experimentalism", in George P. Adams and W. P. Montague (eds.), Contemporary American philosophy, Vol. II (N.Y: Macmillan, 1930) 3-27.
John Dewey, "George Herbert Mead", Journal of philosophy, xxviii (1931) 309-314.
John Dewey, Philosophy and civilization (N.Y: Minton, Balch, 1931. Reprinted N.Y: Capricorn, 1963).
George Dickie, "Francis Hutcheson and the theory of motives", American journal of psychology, lxxiv (1961) 625-629.
E. J. Dijksterhuis, The mechanization of the world picture, trans. (Oxford, 1961).
W. J. Dodds, "On the localisation of the functions of the brain: being an historical and critical analysis of the question", Journal of anatomy and physiology, xii (1878) 340-363, 454-494, 636-660.
Flanders Dunbar, Emotions and bodily change: a survey of literature on psychosomatic inter-relationships 1910-1953, 4th ed. (N.Y: Columbia, 1954).
George Dykhuizen, "John Dewey and the university of Michigan", Journal of the history of ideas, xxiii (1962) 513-544.
Loren Eiseley, "Alfred Russel Wallace", Scientific American, cc (1959) 70-84.
Loren Eiseley, Darwin's century, evolution and the men who discovered it (London: Gollancz, 1959[a]).
Erik H. Erikson, Identity and the life cycle (N.Y: International Universities, 1959).
Erwin A. Esper, A history of psychology (Philadelphia: Saunders, 1964).
Jay W. Fay, American psychology before William James (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers, 1939).
Franklin Fearing, Reflex action: a study in the history of physiological psychology (London: Ballière, 1930).
J.C. Flugel, A hundred years of psychology (1933), 3rd ed. revised by D. J. West (London: Methuen, 1964).
Anna Freud, The ego and the mechanisms of defence, trans. Cecil Baines (London: Hogarth, 1937).
Sigmund Freud, On aphasia: a critical study (1891). trans. E. Stengel (N.Y: International Universities, 1953).
Sigmund Freud, The interpretation of dreams (1901), trans. James Strachey (London: Allen and Unwin, 1954).
Sigmund Freud, An outline of psychoanalysis (1938), trans. J. Strachey (N.Y: Norton, 1949).
Sigmund Freud, The origins of Psycho-analysis, letters to Wilhelm Fliess, drafts and notes.. 1887-1902. Introduction by Ernst Kris (N.Y: Basic. 1954).
John Frosch and Nathaniel Ross (eds.),The annual survey of psychoanalysis, Vol. VIII (N.Y: International Universities, 1964).
John F. Fulton, Selected readings in the history of physiology (Springfield, Ill: Thomas, 1930).
H. M. Gardiner, R. C. Metcalf, and J. G. Beebe-Center, Feeling and emotion: a history of theories (N.Y: American Book Co., 1937).
Wilma George, Biologist philosopher, a study of the life, and writings of Alfred Russel Wallace
(London: Abelard-Schuman, 1964).
Charles Gibbon, The life of George Combe, author of "The constitution of man", 2 vols. (London: Macmillan, 1878).
F. W. Gibbs, Joseph Priestley, adventurer in science and champion of truth (London: Nelson, 1965).
Merton M. Gill, Topography and systems in psychoanalytic theory (N.Y: International Universities, 1963).
Charles C. Gillispie, "The formation of Lamarck's evolutionary theory", Archives inter-nationales d'histoire des sciences, ix (1956) 323-338.
Charles C. Gillispie, "Lamarck and Darwin in the history of science", in B. Glass et al. Forerunners of Darwin: 1745-I859 (Baltimore: Hopkins, 1959) .265-291.
Bronislaw R. Gomulicki, "The development and present status of the trace theory, of memory", British journal of psychology monograph supplements, xxix (Cambridge, 1953).
Sir Gordon Gordon-Taylor and E. W. Walls, Sir Charles Bell: his life and times (London: Livingstone, 1958).
Kathleen M. Grange, "Pinel and eighteenth-century psychiatry,", Bulletin of the history of medicine, xxxv (1961) 442-453.
John C. Greene, "Biology and social theory in the nineteenth century: Auguste Comte and Herbert Spencer", in Marshall Clagett (ed.) Critical problem in the history of science (Madison, Wisconsin: 1959) 419-446.
Norman S. Greenfield and William C. Lewis (eds.), Psychoanalysis and current biological thought (Madison, Wisconsin: 1965).
Alexander Grinstein, The index of psychoanalytic writings, .5 vols. (N.Y: International Universities, in progress).
Jean A. Guer, Histoire critique de lame des betes contenant les sentimens des philosophes anciens et ceux des modernes sur cette matière, 2 vols. (Amsterdam: Chanquion, 1749).
Arnold E. S. Gussin, "Jacques Loeb: the man and his tropism theory of animal conduct", Journal of the history of medicine, xviii (1963) 321-336.
Elie Halévy, The growth of philosophic radicalism, trans. Mary Morris (London: Faber & Faber, 1952).
D.W. Hamlyn, Sensation and perception. a history of the philosophy of perception (London: Routledge, 1961).
Ross Harrison, "Functionalism and its historical significance", Genetic psychology monographs, lxviii (1963) 387-423.
David Hartley, Observations on man, his frame, his duty and his expectations, 2 vols. (London: Leake & Frederick. 1749).
Eduard von Hartmann, Philosophy of the unconscious (1868), trans. William C. Coupland (London: Routledge, 1931).
Heinz Hartmann, Ego psychology and the problem of adaptation, trans. David Rapaport (N.Y: International Universities, 1958).
Heinz Hartman, Essays on ego psychology (N.Y: International Universities, 1964).
Hester Hastings, Man and beast in French thought in the eighteenth century (Baltimore: Hopkins, 1936).
Webb Haymaker (ed.), The founders of neurology, one hundred biographical sketches (Springfield, Ill: Thomas, 1953).
Henry Head, Aphasia and kindred disorders of speech, 2 vols. (Cambridge, 1926).
L. S. Hearnshaw, A short history of British psychology, 1840-1940 (London: Methuen, 1964). Pp. xii + 331. 35s.
Edna Heidbreder, Seven psychologies (N.Y: Appleton, 1933).
Richard J. Herrnstein and Edwin G. Boring, A source book in the history of psychology (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard, 1965). Pp. xx + 636. £5.
Mary B. Hesse, Forces and fields (London: Nelson, 1961).
Ernest R. Hilgard, Theories of learning (N.Y: Century, 1948; 2nd ed., 1958).
Emest R. Hilgard and D. G. Marquis, Conditioning and learning (N.Y: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1940); 2nd ed. Revised by Gregory A. Kimble (London: Methuen, 1961).
Ernest R. Hilgard, "Psychology after Darwin", in Sol Tax, (ed.) Evolution After Darwin, Vol. II (Chicago, 1960) 269-287.
Richard Hofstadter, Social Darwinism in American thought, revised ed. (Boston: Beacon, 1955).
D. T. Howard, "The influence of evolutionary doctrine on psychology", Psychological review, xxxiv (1927) 305-312.
W. S. Hulin, A short history of psychology (N.Y: Holt 1934).
David Hume, A treatise on human nature (1738) (reprint, 2 vols. London: Everyman, 1911).
James Hunt, "On the localisation of the functions of the brain with special reference to the faculty of articulate language", Anthropological review, vi (1868) 329-345; vii (1869) 100-116, 210-214.
Richard Hunter and Ida MacAlpine, Three hundred years of psychiatry -1535-1860 (London: Oxford, 1963).
Robert L. Isaacson, Basic readings in neuropsychology (N.Y: Harper & Row, 1964).
John Hughlings Jackson, Selected Writings, 2 vols. Edited by James Taylor (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1931. Reprinted N.Y: Basic, 1958).
William James, Memories and studies (N.Y: Longmans, 1924).
Sir Geoffrey Jefferson, Selected Papers (London: Pitman, 1960).
Lloyd A. Jeffress (ed.), Cerebral mechanisms in behavior, the Hixon symposium (N.Y: Wiley, 1951).
H. S. Jennings, Behavior of the lower organisms (N.Y: Columbia, 1906).
Ernest Jones, The Life and Work of Sigmund Freud, 3 vols. (N.Y: Basic, 1953, 1955, 1957).
J. R. Kantor, The scientific evolution of psychology (Granville, Ohio: Principia, 1963).
Abram Kardiner and Edward Preble, They Studied Man (London: Secker & Warburg, 1962).
K. D. Keele, Anatomies of pain (Oxford: Blackmell, 1957).
Lester S. King, "Stahl and Hoffmann: a study in eighteenth-century animism", Journal of the history of medicine and allied sciences, xix (1964) 118-130.
Desmond King-Hele, Erasmus Darwin (London: Macmillan, 1963).
Sigmund Koch (ed.), Psychology: a study of a science, 6 vols. (N.Y: McGraw-Hill, 1959-63).
David L. Krantz, "Research activity in 'normal' and 'anomalous' areas", Journal of the history of the behavioral sciences, i (1965) 39-42.
Leonard Krasner, "Studies of the conditioning of verbal behavior", Psychological bulletin, Iv (1958) 148-170.
David Kretch and George S. Klein, Theoretical models and personality theory (Durham: Duke, 1952).
Ernst Kris, "The significance of Freud's earliest discoveries", Internal journal of psychoanalysis, xxxi (1950) 108-116.
H. D. Kruse (ed.), Integrating the approaches to mental disease (N.Y: Hoeber, 1957).
Thomas S. Kuhn, The structure of scientific revolutions (Chicago, 1962; Phoenix edition, 1964).
Frederick A. Lange, The history of materialism and criticism of its present importance, 3rd ed., 3 vols. in I (1875), trans. E. C. Thomas (London: Routledge, 1925).
Karl S. Lashley, The Neuropsychology of Lashley: Selected Papers of K. S. Lashley. Edited by F. A. Beach, et at. (N.Y: McGraw-Hill, 1960).
Thomas Laycock, A treatise on the nervous diseases of women (London: Longmans, 1840).
Thomas Laycock, "On the reflex functions of the brain", British and foreign medical review, xix (1845) 298-311.
Thomas Laycock, "Further researches into the functions of the brain". British and foreign medical chirurgical review, xvi (1855) 155-187.
Thomas Laycock, "Phrenology", in The encyclopedia Britannica, 8th ed., Vol. XVII (Edinburgh: Black, 1859) 556-567.
Thomas Laycock, Mind and brain, or the correlations of consciousness and organization, 2 vols. (Edinburgh: Sutherland and Knox, 1860; 2nd ed., 1869)
George H. Lewes, The biographical history of philosophy from its origin in Greece down to the present day, 2nd edition (London: Parker, 1857).
George H. Lewes, The history of philosophy from Thales to Comte, 3rd ed., 2 vols. (London: Longmans, Vol. I, 1867; Vol. II, 1871).
George H. Lewes, Problems of life and mind, 5 vols. (London: Trübner, 1874-79).
E. G. T. Liddell, The discovery of reflexes (Oxford: Clarendon, 1960).
Robert B. Livingston, "How man looks at his own brain", in Sigmund Koch (ed.), 1962 pp. 51-99.
Arthur O. Lovejoy, The great chain of being, a study in the history of an idea (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard, 1936. Reprinted N.Y: Harper, 1960).
Sir James Mackintosh, "Dissertation second: exhibiting a general view of the progress of ethical philosophy chiefly during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries", in The encyclopedia Britannica, 8th ed., Vol. 1 (Edinburgh: Black, 1860) 309-445.
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